United States v. Mitchell
2017 CAAF LEXIS 856
| C.A.A.F. | 2017Background
- Sgt. Edward J. Mitchell II was accused of harassing his wife and investigators obtained verbal authorization to seize and search his electronic media, including an iPhone.
- Mitchell was told his rights and invoked his right to counsel at the MP station. He was later brought to his commander's office ~2 hours later while investigators arrived to execute the seizure.
- Investigators seized the iPhone, saw it was passcode-protected, and asked Mitchell for the PIN; he refused to speak it. They then handed the phone back and asked him to unlock it; Mitchell entered the passcode and permanently disabled the phone’s passcode protection.
- A military judge suppressed the iPhone and its contents as the product of a custodial interrogation in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Edwards v. Arizona; the government appealed and the Army CCA remanded and later affirmed suppression of contents. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reviewed the case.
- The CAAF held Mitchell was in custody at the time of the re-contact, the investigators’ request to provide or enter the passcode constituted interrogation reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, Edwards protection had been invoked, and thus the contents must be suppressed; the physical phone itself was not suppressed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mitchell) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did re-contact and asking for the passcode violate Edwards/Miranda after Mitchell invoked counsel? | Re-contact while in custody and asking for the passcode was interrogation after invocation of counsel and thus forbidden under Edwards. | The request was a routine request for access/consent to execute a valid search authorization, not interrogation barred by Edwards. | Held for Mitchell: re-contact was custodial, questions/requests were interrogation and violated Edwards. |
| Was entering the passcode a testimonial, incriminating act protected by the Fifth Amendment? | Entering the passcode was an incriminating response or at least a link in the chain of evidence and therefore falls within Edwards’ protections. | The passcode-entry was non-testimonial or not incriminating (akin to consent or physical act); thus Fifth Amendment protections do not bar the request. | CAAF treated the conduct as an incriminating response for Edwards purposes and enforced suppression under M.R.E. 305(c)(2) without resolving testimonial label fully. |
| Is derivative evidence (phone contents) admissible despite Edwards violation (Patane/inevitable discovery)? | Derivative evidence obtained after the Edwards violation must be suppressed under the plain language of M.R.E. 305(c)(2). | Patane suggests physical evidence discovered after Miranda violations can be admissible; here the contents should be admissible or inevitable discovery (e.g., Touch ID). | Held: contents suppressed under M.R.E. 305(c)(2); Government failed to show inevitability (no proof Touch ID would have worked). |
| Was suppression of the physical iPhone itself required? | The phone and its contents were both fruits of the Edwards violation and should be suppressed. | The phone was lawfully seized under authorization before any Edwards violation and is not derivative evidence of the interrogation. | Held: physical phone was lawfully seized earlier and should not have been suppressed; only the contents are suppressed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes rights warnings and counsel protections during custodial interrogation)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (prohibits further custodial interrogation after a suspect invokes right to counsel)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (defines "interrogation" to include words or actions likely to elicit incriminating response)
- Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (Fifth Amendment protects statements that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence)
- United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (explains compelled production and the evidentiary link concept)
- United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (plurality discussing admissibility of physical evidence following Miranda violations)
- Maryland v. Shatzer, 569 U.S. 98 (limits on how Edwards protections may terminate)
- Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (Miranda as constitutionally grounded rule)
- Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (distinguishes providing access to evidence from testimonial compelled statements)
- California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (custody inquiry standard)
- Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (discusses testimonial requirement under Fifth Amendment)