United States v. Mitchell
1:16-cr-00256
S.D. Ala.Jun 30, 2021Background
- Mitchell pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); the PSR listed three prior qualifying convictions: 1973 assault with intent to murder, 1992 unlawful distribution of cocaine, and 2009 second-degree assault (Alabama).
- The PSR recommended ACCA treatment (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) because Mitchell had three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses; defense counsel objected to the ACCA designation.
- At sentencing (June 2017) the district court found Alabama second-degree assault, assault with intent to murder, and the 1992 drug distribution conviction qualified as ACCA predicates and imposed the mandatory 15-year minimum.
- The Eleventh Circuit, on direct appeal, held Mitchell’s second-degree assault conviction qualified as an ACCA violent felony under the elements clause; Mitchell did not seek certiorari.
- Mitchell filed a pro se § 2255 motion raising Johnson/Descamps challenges to the ACCA enhancement, arguing his prior convictions did not qualify, and asserting ineffective assistance and double-jeopardy/due-process claims.
- The magistrate judge recommended denial of the § 2255 motion, finding the second-degree assault challenge procedurally barred and all claims meritless; recommended denial of a certificate of appealability.
Issues
| Issue | Mitchell's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alabama second-degree assault qualifies as an ACCA predicate | Second-degree assault does not categorically qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA | Eleventh Circuit already rejected Mitchell’s challenge on direct appeal; conviction qualifies under elements clause | Procedurally barred from relitigation; merits rejected (Eleventh Circuit decision controls) |
| Whether 1992 unlawful distribution and assault with intent to murder qualify as ACCA predicates | These convictions do not qualify (claims invoking Johnson/Descamps) | 1992 drug conviction is a "serious drug offense" under §924(e)(2)(A); assault with intent to murder qualifies under elements clause | Claims meritless: drug conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense; assault with intent to murder qualifies under elements clause |
| Whether Johnson or Descamps provide relief (residual/elemental challenges) | Mitchell argues ACCA enhancement relied on the now-invalid residual clause or misapplied elements/modified-categorical approach | Johnson residual clause inapplicable to drug predicate; sentencing and law post-Johnson made reliance on residual clause unlikely; Descamps not applicable to drug offense | Johnson/Descamps claims fail: residual clause not the basis for enhancement; Descamps inapplicable or claims without merit |
| Ineffective assistance, coercion to plead, and double jeopardy/multipunishment claims | Counsel coerced guilty plea to 70 months; counsel failed to object to PSR/stacking; enhancement is unconstitutional multiple punishment | Plea colloquy contradicts coercion claim; counsel did object to PSR and ACCA designation; recidivist enhancements do not violate double jeopardy/due process | Claims are conclusory, contradicted by the record, and meritless; no relief warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (collateral relief is not a substitute for direct appeal)
- Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (procedural default rule for § 2255 claims not raised on direct appeal)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits on comparing prior convictions under the categorical approach)
- Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir.) (standards for proving a Johnson claim on collateral review)
- Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (recidivist sentence enhancements are not double jeopardy)
- Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) (recidivism statutes upheld against double jeopardy and related constitutional challenges)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (certificate of appealability standards where petition dismissed)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for issuing a certificate of appealability)
- Burgess v. United States, 874 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir.) (court must give parties notice before raising procedural default sua sponte)