United States v. Miranda-Diaz
942 F.3d 33
| 1st Cir. | 2019Background
- On May 10, 2017, Miranda-Díaz was stopped in Puerto Rico and found with a .40 Glock, two loaded magazines; he admitted he lacked a carry license.
- He told ATF agents he had arrived from New York six days earlier and was on parole there for possession of one kilogram of cocaine; a background check showed a prior felony conviction.
- Indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he pleaded guilty; the PSI set offense level 12 and criminal history category III, yielding a Guidelines range of 15–21 months.
- The district court, citing Miranda-Díaz’s repeated criminal encounters (including a dismissed illegal appropriation charge tied to a diversion program and the New York controlled-substance conviction/parole), imposed an upward variance to 36 months.
- Miranda-Díaz objected generally to the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable and appealed, challenging the court’s consideration of the dismissed charge and the prior drug conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Miranda‑Díaz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court procedurally erred by considering facts related to a dismissed illegal appropriation charge | Court may rely on undisputed PSI facts describing conduct related to the dismissed charge | Consideration of dismissed charge equates to relying on a bare arrest and improperly inflates criminal history (relying on Marrero‑Pérez) | No error — court relied on unchallenged PSI admissions and did not equate arrest with guilt |
| Whether the court erred by considering the prior NY controlled‑substance conviction | The conviction and the admitted underlying conduct were in the PSI and properly considered | Court improperly relied on reclassified/initial charge (contention perfunctory) | Waived/perfunctory; court permissibly considered undisputed PSI description |
| Whether Miranda‑Díaz preserved his specific procedural objections at sentencing | Generic post‑sentence objection is insufficient to preserve specific sentencing claims | The generic objection preserved the challenges | No — generic objection inadequate; appellate review is for plain error when not preserved |
| Whether the 36‑month upward variance was substantively unreasonable | Variance justified by pattern of recidivism, parole violation, community protection, and deterrence | Variance unreasonable because it relied on dismissed charge and prior conviction | Substantively reasonable — district court articulated a plausible rationale and reached a defensible result |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Marrero‑Pérez, 914 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.) (district courts should not rely on bare arrests without independent corroboration when imposing upward departures)
- United States v. Mercer, 834 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.) (courts may rely on undisputed PSI descriptions of conduct tied to dismissed charges)
- United States v. Rodríguez‑Reyes, 925 F.3d 558 (1st Cir.) (distinguishes departures from variances and discusses limits on relying on arrests)
- United States v. Matos‑de‑Jesús, 856 F.3d 174 (1st Cir.) (two‑step review of sentencing: procedural then substantive)
- United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.) (four‑part plain‑error test)
- United States v. González‑Rodríguez, 859 F.3d 134 (1st Cir.) (PSI reports generally bear sufficient indicia of reliability)
- United States v. Ocasio‑Cancel, 727 F.3d 85 (1st Cir.) (undisputed PSI facts may be treated as true for sentencing)
- United States v. Gallardo‑Ortiz, 666 F.3d 808 (1st Cir.) (caution against using mere arrests to justify upward departures)