United States v. Miranda-Carmona, 999 F.3d 762

Miranda pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base; remaining counts dismissed. PSR assigned 11 criminal-history points (Category V).
Two prior Puerto Rico convictions (domestic abuse and protective-order violation) resulted in concurrent prison sentences of 1 year 9 months each. PSR counted 3 points for each under U.S.S.G. §4A1.1(a).
Miranda objected under U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(a)(2), arguing same-day concurrent sentences should be treated as a single sentence because there was no "intervening arrest." He initially claimed no arrest occurred for either offense.
Probation addendum and district-court inquiry explained Miranda was Mirandized and brought before a judge (probable cause determination) after the first incident; sentencing counsel ultimately conceded at the May 29 hearing that Miranda had been arrested and in custody after the December 16, 2012 incident.
The district court found an "intervening arrest," counted each prior sentence separately (totaling 6 points), computed a Guidelines range of 84–105 months, and imposed an 84-month sentence. Miranda appealed arguing no intervening arrest.
The First Circuit affirmed, holding Miranda invited any error by counsel's concession at sentencing and therefore cannot repudiate that concession on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the two prior, same-day concurrent sentences should be counted separately under U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(a)(2) (i.e., whether an "intervening arrest" separated the offenses)	Government: Probation and district court correctly found an arrest (Mirandized and brought before a judge) after the first offense, so sentences are separated by an intervening arrest and counted separately.	Miranda: No qualifying arrest occurred between the offenses, so same-day concurrent sentences should be treated as a single sentence for Guidelines points.	Court affirmed that sentences were counted separately, but disposition rests on invited-error doctrine: counsel conceded an arrest occurred, so Miranda cannot challenge that finding on appeal.
Whether Miranda may challenge on appeal the district court's finding when his counsel conceded the arrest at sentencing (invited error / sandbagging)	Government: Miranda invited the district court's finding by counsel's representation and therefore waived the right to challenge it on appeal.	Miranda: Argued the intervening-arrest inquiry was misdirected by the government or otherwise contestable; claimed the second-offense arrest (if any) would be irrelevant.	Court held Miranda invited the error via counsel's concession; appellate challenge precluded. Court rejected Miranda's assertion that the government directed the inquiry.

United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 846 F.3d 417 (1st Cir. 2017) (a party cannot concede an issue in district court and later repudiate the concession on appeal)
United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (invited-error principle bars appellate reversal where party led court to a particular finding)
McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1979) (litigant may not "sandbag" by presenting one theory below and another on appeal)