United States v. Minjarez
374 F. Supp. 3d 977
E.D. Cal.2019Background
- Michael Minjarez was convicted in 2011 of five bank/credit-union robbery counts and sentenced to mandatory life under the federal three‑strikes statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), based on two prior California convictions: voluntary manslaughter and second‑degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211).
- The PSR and sentencing court treated Minjarez as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and applied mandatory life because the government filed a § 851 information alleging two prior "serious violent felonies."
- Minjarez appealed; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. He then filed a § 2255 motion arguing his California § 211 robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a "serious violent felony" in light of Johnson and Dimaya.
- The government argued § 211 fits within § 3559(c)’s enumerated definitions of robbery or extortion and that Johnson’s retroactive effect is limited to ACCA cases.
- The district court applied the categorical approach, followed Ninth Circuit precedent (Dixon, Garcia‑Lopez), and analyzed the three‑strikes statute’s elements, concluding California robbery is not a categorical match to the elements or enumerated clauses and the statute’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.
- Result: Court granted § 2255, vacated the § 3559(c) life sentence, and ordered resentencing without the three‑strikes enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cal. Penal Code § 211 robbery is a "serious violent felony" under § 3559(c) elements clause | Minjarez: § 211 is not a categorical match because it criminalizes threats to property and accidental use of force, which do not necessarily involve use/threatened use of physical force against a person | Gov: § 211 qualifies as robbery/extortion under § 3559(c) and Ninth Circuit precedent supports treating § 211 as a crime of violence | Held: § 211 is not a categorical match to the elements clause; Dixon and Garcia‑Lopez control and foreclose treating § 211 as per the elements clause |
| Whether § 211 fits the § 3559(c) enumerated definitions of "robbery" or "extortion" (18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2113, 2118; § 3559(c)(2)(C)) | Minjarez: § 211 covers mere threats to property (e.g., threats to damage property) and thus broader than federal robbery/extortion requiring fear of bodily harm | Gov: The statute lists robbery/extortion; prior Ninth Circuit decisions (under Guidelines definitions) suggest § 211 counts as robbery/extortion | Held: § 211 is broader than federal robbery/extortion as defined in § 3559(c) and thus is not a categorical match to either enumerated offense |
| Whether the § 3559(c) residual clause (substantial‑risk/"by its nature") is constitutional after Johnson and Dimaya | Minjarez: residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson and Dimaya and cannot save § 211 as a predicate | Gov: contended Johnson's retroactivity is limited (or that enumeration suffices) | Held: The residual clause in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague (same two defects identified in Johnson/Dimaya) and cannot supply a valid predicate |
| Whether Johnson (and Dimaya) apply retroactively on collateral review to § 3559(c) sentences | Minjarez: Johnson announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively per Welch; therefore his § 2255 is timely | Gov: argued Johnson’s retroactivity is limited to ACCA cases | Held: Johnson is substantive and retroactive under Welch, so petitioner’s § 2255 is timely and relief is available |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson announced a new substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (§ 16(b) residual clause void for vagueness; Johnson principles extended)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical approach and divisibility framework)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limitations on using statutory alternatives and when to apply the categorical approach)
- United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2015) (California § 211 not a categorical match to ACCA elements clause)
- United States v. Garcia‑Lopez, 903 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2018) (applies Dixon to § 16(a); California robbery not a crime of violence under elements clause)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Sentencing Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge)