United States v. Miller, 646 F.3d 1128

Miller was charged in a one-count indictment with possession of a firearm while subject to a restraining order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2).
He pleaded guilty after the district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the theory that he did not knowingly possess a firearm due to lack of knowledge of the restraining order.
A year-long Iowa state protective order against Miller for threats/abuse to the child's mother warned of federal penalties and indicated Miller and the protected person were intimate partners; box (4) was checked, and box (6) prohibited firearm possession.
Miller was stopped for DUI on December 3, 2009, and, after threats to a state patrol trooper, was found with a firearm and ammunition in his car on December 7, 2009, leading to the § 922(g)(8) charge.
At sentencing, the district court previously calculated a 15–21 month advisory range but varied upward by 48 months based on aggravated factors including threats to the trooper and Miller’s criminal history.
The First Circuit reviews the conviction for due process in light of Lambert and reviews the sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Miller's conviction violates due process due to lack of knowledge	Miller argues Lambert excused his conduct due to reliance on the state court's advice.	Miller contends he did not knowingly possess a firearm because he was unaware of the restraining order's applicability.	No Lambert violation; knowledge of facts, not the law, required; conviction affirmed.
Whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable	Miller claims the upward variance did not adequately reflect mitigating factors.	The district court reasonably varied upward for aggravating circumstances and Miller's dangerousness.	Sentence affirmed under deferential abuse-of-discretion review.

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957) (due process limits on punishment for passive, unnoticeable conduct)
United States v. Farrell, 69 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1995) (knowingly_violate requires knowledge of facts, not knowledge of law)
United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2004) (mens rea required is knowledge of facts constituting the offense)
Hutzell v. United States, 217 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2000) (Lambert-like fairness considerations; notice and warning discussed)
Beavers v. United States, 206 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2000) (awareness of firearm restrictions under restraining orders)
Meade v. United States, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999) (possession under anti-harassment orders analyzed as heightened regulation)
Baker v. United States, 197 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1999) (duty to warn and notice in possession of weapons under restraining orders)
United States v. San-Miguel, 634 F.3d 471 (8th Cir. 2011) (upward variance reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))
United States v. Jones, 509 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2007) (deferential review of sentence under Gall framework)
United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (due process challenges to § 922(g)(8) rejected)
United States v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 2000) (Lambert-based challenges to § 922(g)(8) rejected)