589 F.Supp.3d 60
D.D.C.2022Background:
- Defendant Garret Miller was indicted for conduct during the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol; Count Three charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) for corruptly obstructing Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote.
- Indictment alleges Miller pushed past officers to enter the Capitol, posted videos/selfies from inside, made incriminating social-media statements, and later posted violent threats; Count Three itself contains only the statutory language alleging obstruction of the official proceeding.
- § 1512(c) contains two subsections: (c)(1) criminalizes corrupt alteration/destruction/concealment of records/documents/objects for use in an official proceeding, and (c)(2) criminalizes corrupt obstruction, influence, or impediment of any official proceeding “otherwise.”
- Miller moved to dismiss Count Three, arguing (inter alia) that the electoral certification is not an "official proceeding," that § 1512(c)(2) does not reach his alleged conduct absent action affecting a record/document/object, and that the term "corruptly" is vague.
- The Court limited its review to the indictment, applied rules of statutory interpretation (text, structure, history), and emphasized judicial restraint and the rule of lenity where grave ambiguity exists.
- Holding: The Court concluded § 1512(c)(2) is ambiguous but is best read as limited by (c)(1) (i.e., requiring action with respect to a record/document/other object); because the indictment does not allege such conduct by Miller, Count Three was dismissed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Electoral College certification is an "official proceeding" under § 1512 | Government: §1515(a)(1)(B) defines an official proceeding to include a proceeding before Congress; certification plainly qualifies | Miller: "Proceeding" should be read in a judicial sense; certification is not a judicial proceeding | Held: Certification is an "official proceeding" (indictment adequately alleges this element) |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2) reaches conduct like Miller's (i.e., non-document-directed obstruction) | Government: "Otherwise" creates a broad, stand-alone prohibition; (c)(2) is a catchall barring corrupt obstruction of official proceedings regardless of documents | Miller: "Otherwise" ties (c)(2) to (c)(1); (c)(2) must be read to require conduct like altering/destroying/concealing a record/document/object | Held: Ambiguity exists; consistent with text, structure, history, and rule of lenity, (c)(2) is limited by (c)(1) and requires action with respect to a document/record/other object |
| Whether the mens rea term "corruptly" is unconstitutionally vague as applied | Government: "Corruptly" has established judicial meaning and is not vague in context | Miller: "Corruptly" is undefined and lacks limiting principle, creating vagueness | Held: Court analyzed vagueness arguments but resolved case on statutory scope; did not rest dismissal solely on vagueness |
| Whether the indictment sufficiently alleges elements required under the Court's reading of § 1512(c)(2) | Government: factual allegations elsewhere (or broader reading) show obstruction of certification | Miller: Count Three contains only statutory language and no allegation of actions against documents/records/objects | Held: Indictment fails to allege the required document/record/object conduct under the Court's statutory reading; Count Three dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (interpreting the limiting effect of the word "otherwise" in a residual clause)
- Aguilar v. United States, 515 U.S. 593 (urging judicial restraint in construing broad omnibus criminal clauses)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (statutory drafting/formatting can inform whether clauses are separate)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (Sarbanes–Oxley context and purpose of statutes addressing document shredding)
- Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (canon: Congress does not hide major policy changes in obscure provisions)
- United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459 (discussion of rule of lenity and resolving grievous statutory ambiguity)