United States v. Mikel Alemin Craig
706 F. App'x 545
11th Cir.2017Background
- Craig pled guilty to one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)) based on recruiting and forcing a 19-year-old, drug-addicted woman (S.D.) to engage in commercial sex via Backpage ads.
- The written plea and proffered facts described physical beatings, threats, providing cocaine and forcing repayment via prostitution; Craig collected proceeds.
- The PSI added that Craig was involved with trafficking at least four women, repeatedly abused S.D., and recruited a driver (W.S.) to transport S.D.; W.S. corroborated the abuse.
- The PSI applied a 2-level aggravating role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for managing/leading at least one participant (W.S.) and treated Craig as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because § 1591 was considered a "crime of violence."
- Craig did not object to the PSI in district court; the court imposed a within-guidelines 300-month sentence. Craig appealed, raising plain-error challenges to the role enhancement and the career-offender designation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Craig) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3B1.1(c) aggravating role enhancement was plain error | Enhancement improper because Craig did not manage/lead other criminally responsible participants | PSI facts (undisputed) show Craig recruited and controlled W.S., who knowingly assisted trafficking | No plain error — enhancement upheld because W.S. was a criminally responsible participant whom Craig managed |
| Whether § 1591(a)(1) is a "crime of violence" for career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 | § 1591(a)(1) is not categorically a crime of violence; reliance on contrary authority (e.g., Fuertes) | Even if unresolved, no plain error; and § 1591 qualifies under the residual clause as posing serious risk of physical injury (citing Willoughby) | No plain error; career-offender enhancement sustained because § 1591(a)(1) qualifies under § 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause (as of guidelines in effect at sentencing) |
| Whether Amendment 798 (removing residual clause) applies | Craig urged that the amended guideline eliminates the residual clause, making § 1591 not a crime of violence | Amendment 798 is substantive and not retroactive; apply the guideline version in effect at sentencing | Amendment 798 not applied; district court properly used the pre-amendment guideline language |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2014) (§ 1591 poses serious potential risk of physical injury and qualifies under residual clause)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory sentencing guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges)
- United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2000) (control over a single participant can support § 3B1.1 enhancement)
- United States v. Zitron, 810 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2016) (government must prove sentencing-enhancement facts by preponderance)
- United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2014) (undisputed PSI facts may be relied upon without additional evidence)
- United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011) (apply guideline version in effect at sentencing unless an amendment is clarifying)
- United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (no plain error where no controlling Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent)
- United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding § 1591(a)(1) not a categorical crime of violence under § 924(c); distinguished in this opinion)