United States v. Miguel Espericueta-Perez, 528 F. App'x 572

Espericueta-Perez is a Mexican citizen with no legal status in the U.S.
He was convicted in Ohio state court in 2005 of gross sexual imposition involving a 12-year-old, receiving a four-year sentence and 10 years of sex-offender registration.
After his release, he was deported in December 2005 and a warrant was issued for absconding if he returned.
He returned to the U.S. and was arrested in 2008 on an absconder warrant; he was convicted in Ohio for failing to register an address as a sex offender and received additional incarceration; his community control was revoked.
ICE detained him after a 2009 state custody encounter, and he was released to ICE custody in February 2012.
In March 2012 a grand jury indicted him for illegal reentry after deportation following an aggravated felony conviction; he pleaded guilty in April 2012.
The PSR calculated a total offense level of 21 and criminal history category IV, yielding a guideline range of 57–71 months with 3–3 years of supervised release; the government and defense recommended the guideline range.
The district court sentenced him to 71 months with a three-year term of supervised release, and intended deportation after imprisonment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether supervised release was procedurally reasonable under § 5D1.1(c)	Espericueta-Perez argues the court failed to adequately explain the necessity of supervised release.	The government contends the district court provided a particularized explanation based on deterrence and protection.	No error; explanation adequate; deterrence supported by case history.
Whether the court impermissibly relied on a lenient state sentence to determine the federal sentence	Espericueta-Perez claims the court considered leniency from the Ohio sentence in setting the federal term.	The court discussed deterrence and protection, not leniency as a primary factor.	Not reversible; court’s discussion tethered to § 3553(a) factors and deterrence.
Whether the 71-month term is substantively reasonable given the § 3553(a) factors	Espericueta-Perez argues a shorter sentence would suffice given his first reentry and family circumstances.	The district court appropriately weighed the gravity of offense, history, deterrence, and public protection within the Guidelines range.	Presumption of reasonableness applies; 71 months within range and not substantively unreasonable.

United States v. Recla, 560 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2009) (remand for improper consideration of potential sentence reduction)
United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2007) (impermissible factor when considering downward departure)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. 2007) (reasonableness framework for sentencing appellate review)
United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011) (procedural reasonableness—requirement to consider § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion review and totality of circumstances)
United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008) (deference to district court balancing § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2006) (defers to district court’s weighting of § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008) (soundness of sentencing within guidelines given total circumstances)
United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007) (presumption of reasonableness for within-range sentences)
United States v. Tristan–Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2010) (within-range sentencing entitled to presumption of reasonableness)
United States v. Corp, 668 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2012) (case-specific determination of § 3553(a) factors can justify variance)