United States v. Miguel Alvarado-Linares
698 F. App'x 969
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Four MS-13 members (Alvarado‑Linares, Escobar, Alfaro‑Granados, Reyna‑Ozuna) convicted by jury of RICO conspiracy and various VICAR and firearm offenses tied to multiple murders around Atlanta.
- Alvarado‑Linares identified as local leader; defendants shared a pool of gang firearms and participated in or directed several murders (execution of Lal Ko; highway shooting of rival members; gas‑station killing).
- Sentences: Alvarado‑Linares and Alfaro‑Granados received life terms plus consecutive terms; Escobar received concurrent life terms plus a consecutive term; Reyna‑Ozuna received 96 months (RICO) + consecutive 60 months (§924(c)).
- Key jury findings: several defendants found to have aided and abetted murders and firearm use; Reyna‑Ozuna acquitted of VICAR murder and §924(j) death‑result charge but convicted of lesser §924(c) and specifically found not to have brandished the gun.
- Appellate challenges included: indictment sufficiency (RICO enterprise and interstate commerce), Speedy Trial Act calculation (state vs federal arrest), Eighth Amendment proportionality to life sentences, jury instruction on aiding & abetting and jury/court roles, and alleged internally inconsistent verdicts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indictment sufficiency for RICO enterprise (Alvarado) | Indictment fails to allege an "association‑in‑fact" enterprise or interstate commerce effect | Indictment detailed enterprise and interstate nexus (national gang participation) | Affirmed: indictment legally sufficient under Eleventh Circuit precedents |
| Speedy Trial Act — start date for federal indictment (Alvarado; Escobar) | State arrest should count toward the 30‑day federal indictment clock due to coordination between state and federal authorities | Federal arrest date controls; no recognized "ruse" exception where state arrest used to hold suspect for later federal charge | Affirmed: federal arrest date governs; no relief and no evidentiary hearing abuse of discretion |
| Eighth Amendment proportionality to life sentences (Escobar; Alfaro‑Granados; Reyna‑Ozuna) | Life sentence for non‑shooter or lesser participant is cruel and unusual | Statutorily authorized life sentences for RICO/VICAR murders not grossly disproportionate | Affirmed: narrow non‑capital proportionality standard not met; life sentences upheld |
| Jury instructions — aiding & abetting and jury vs court role (Reyna; Escobar) | Instruction misstated aiding & abetting intent element (post‑Rosemond) and mischaracterized punishment role of jury | Model instructions were proper; Rosemond inapplicable given evidence Reyna provided the gun; jury role instruction accurate even if judge has no remaining sentencing discretion | Affirmed: no plain error; instructions proper |
| Alleged inconsistent verdicts / §924(c) conviction without predicate (Reyna‑Ozuna) | Conviction on §924(c) impossible after acquittal on VICAR murder and §924(j) death charge | Inconsistent verdicts do not warrant relief where evidence suffices to support the conviction; acquittal may represent lenity | Affirmed: sufficient evidence for §924(c); inconsistency explained by jury lenity and not reviewable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir.) (indictment sufficiency standard)
- United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir.) (RICO interstate‑commerce nexus in gang contexts)
- United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir.) (federal Speedy Trial Act clock measured from federal arrest)
- United States v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833 (11th Cir.) (limited "ruse" context for Speedy Trial Act when federal immigration ruse detains for prosecution)
- Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.) (standard for abuse‑of‑discretion review of evidentiary hearings)
- United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (Sup. Ct.) (inconsistent jury verdicts; acquittal may reflect lenity and does not mandate relief)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (Sup. Ct.) (aiding‑and‑abetting advance‑knowledge rule for firearm use in drug‑transaction context)