United States v. Michelle Wing
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12669
| 9th Cir. | 2012Background
- Wing was convicted of bank embezzlement (2001) and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release, which began February 11, 2004.
- In 2008, Wing’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke her first term of supervised release for multiple violations; Montana court revoked, imposing 3 months’ imprisonment followed by 33 months’ supervised release.
- In 2008–2009, Wing faced an Eastern District of Washington indictment for bank fraud and related offenses; Montana sought to revoke Wing’s second term of supervised release based on conduct from the Washington case and other violations.
- Wing was released from prison and then faced a Montana revocation hearing on November 20, 2009, where the court revoked her second term of supervised release and imposed 33 months’ imprisonment to run concurrently with the Washington sentence.
- Wing appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke a future term of supervised release for violations of a prior, revoked term; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for vacatur of the November 20, 2009 judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3583(e)(3) authorizes revoking a future term based on violations of a past term. | Wing contends revocation hinges on the violated term being current. | Government argues a future term can be revoked for any violation of any term. | No; revocation must be based on a violation of the term being revoked. |
| Whether Johnson v. United States controls the interpretation post-1994 amendments. | Wing relies on Johnson’s vitality for broad revocation power. | Government asserts amendments render Johnson’s reasoning obsolete. | Johnson’s interpretation does not apply post-amendments; revocation must relate to the specific term. |
| How the PROTECT Act amendments and § 3583(h)–(i) shape Parliament’s structure of terms of supervised release. | Wing’s reading would create ambiguity in imprisonment and release lengths. | Government argues amendments support the majority’s approach. | AMENDMENTS clarify separate, capped terms; no vitality to predecessor term. |
| Does the sentencing scheme and finality policy support the district court’s approach? | Wing argues finality prevents successive revocations for prior violations. | State interests in deterrence and protection justify revocations. | Overall policy favors separating terms and capping revocation-based punishment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (U.S. 2000) (revoke may retain vitality under pre-amendment language; not controlling after 1994 amendments)
- United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (amendments clarifying maximum term of imprisonment for revocations)
- United States v. Xinidakis, 598 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (discusses post-amendment interpretation)
- United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizes sanctioning breaches of trust in revocations)
- Gollehon v. Mahoney, 626 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (rule of lenity applies to ambiguities in criminal statutes)
- United States v. Juarez, 601 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for jurisdictional questions)