United States v. Michael White
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21734
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Michael L. White owned a two-unit duplex in Van, West Virginia, insured as a two-family rental; he purchased fire insurance in July 2009 covering $80,000 for the building.
- Facing financial trouble and frustrated by non-paying tenants, White solicited neighbor Doug Kinder (through his wife Kim) to burn the duplex and offered $4,000; he paid about $2,000 after the fire.
- The duplex was set on fire October 16, 2009; White recovered the full policy limits and later made statements to insurance adjusters suggesting a tenant started the fire.
- White was tried by jury and convicted of (1) conspiracy to commit arson and mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 844(i), 1341), (2) aiding and abetting arson (18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a), 844(i)), and (3) accessory after the fact to arson (18 U.S.C. § 3, § 844(i)); concurrent 78-month sentences were imposed.
- On appeal White challenged: sufficiency of the interstate-commerce nexus for arson convictions when the duplex was vacant at ignition; sufficiency of evidence for accessory-after-the-fact liability; and the sentencing classification of the duplex as a "dwelling" under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interstate-commerce element under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) when tenants were not physically present at fire | Government: rental use of property over time, insurance labeling, and facts support the duplex being "used in an activity affecting commerce." | White: Jones requires the property be actively used (i.e., occupied by tenant) at the moment of the fire; vacant units mean no commerce nexus. | Court: Affirmed — Parsons controls; long-term rental use + insurance and no indication of intent to remove from rental market suffice for § 844(i). |
| Sufficiency of evidence for accessory after the fact (18 U.S.C. § 3) based on White's false statements to insurer | Government: White knew of the arson, had motive to shield co-conspirator/himself; misleading statements to adjuster would be reported to SIU and law enforcement — satisfies intent and assistance elements. | White: Statements to an insurer (not law enforcement) were mere passing comments; no evidence he knew statements would prevent apprehension. | Court: Affirmed — reasonable inferences (self-interest, adjuster-to-law-enforcement reporting) permit conviction for accessory after the fact. |
| Whether defendant can be convicted as both principal (aiding/abetting) and accessory after the fact | Government: conviction valid; accessory charge supported by separate act (false statement) that aided avoidance of detection. | White (and dissent): Legal inconsistency — one cannot be principal and accessory after the fact to the same offense. | Majority: Declined to reach or reverse under plain-error standard; noted circuit split and declined to order reversal. (Dissent would vacate accessory conviction.) |
| Sentencing classification: was the duplex a "dwelling" under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4? | Government: brief vacancy does not change core character as dwelling; tenant property and utilities remained; sentencing level for dwelling applies. | White: Vacancy removed the property’s dwelling status; lower base offense level should apply. | Court: Affirmed — short vacancy (weeks) and continued indicia of residence (personal effects, power, prior rental use) mean it remained a "dwelling." |
Key Cases Cited
- Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985) (rental of real estate is an activity affecting interstate commerce under § 844(i))
- Parsons v. United States, 993 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1993) (vacancy alone does not remove rental property's commerce nexus; insured-as-rental + defendant’s intent relevant)
- Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (§ 844(i) does not cover owner-occupied private residences used only for everyday family living; requires active commercial use)
- United States v. Jackson, 22 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 1994) (vacancy can, in some circumstances, change a structure’s character from dwelling to mere building)
- United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2003) (brief or seasonal vacancy does not strip a structure of dwelling status under § 2K1.4)