918 F.3d 1174
11th Cir.2019Background
- Michael St. Hubert pleaded guilty to two § 924(c) counts based on Hobbs Act robberies and appealed his 32‑year sentence, arguing the predicate offenses were not "crimes of violence" under § 924(c)(3).
- The panel affirmed St. Hubert’s convictions, relying in part on prior Eleventh Circuit three‑judge published orders (e.g., In re Saint Fleur) holding Hobbs Act robbery a § 924(c)(3)(A) offense.
- The opinion and the denial of rehearing en banc produced several separate opinions addressing: (a) whether published three‑judge orders issued in the § 2255(h)/§ 2244(b) successive‑petition context are binding precedent; (b) the permissible scope of the appellate ‘‘prima facie’’ gatekeeping review for successive § 2255 applications; and (c) whether attempt offenses qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The majority upheld (1) that published three‑judge orders in the successive‑application context are binding precedent in the Circuit unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court, and (2) that panels may deny meritless successive‑motion applications after a prima facie review that can overlap merits issues.
- Dissenting and concurring judges raised institutional and procedural concerns about (a) publishing and treating as binding orders issued on expedited, non‑adversarial § 2255(h)/§ 2244(b) applications; (b) the limited 30‑day, nonappealable nature of those proceedings; and (c) the legal doctrines applied to attempt offenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3) | St. Hubert: the Hobbs Act predicates do not categorically qualify as crimes of violence | Government: Hobbs Act robbery (and attempt) qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) and/or (B) (residual clause) | Panel affirmed convictions; held Hobbs Act robbery (and attempt, per panel reasoning) qualify as crimes of violence; denial of en banc rehearing affirmed this outcome |
| Whether published three‑judge orders issued on § 2255(h)/§ 2244(b) successive‑application panels are binding precedent circuit‑wide | Dissent: such expedited, non‑adversarial, nonappealable orders should not bind later merits panels | Majority/concurring: published three‑judge orders are binding precedent under the Circuit’s prior‑panel rule and subject to en banc or Supreme Court reversal | Court held published three‑judge orders are binding precedent unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court |
| Proper scope of the court of appeals’ ‘‘prima facie’’ review for authorization to file successive § 2255 motions | Dissent: § 2244(b)(3)(C) limits the court to a preliminary showing; panels should not decide merits in that nonappealable context | Majority/concurring: ‘‘prima facie’’ is a functional standard that may include assessing whether an application is plainly doomed and can overlap merits to avoid wasting district court resources | Court and concurrences endorse a prima facie standard that can consider merits‑related matters; panels may deny clearly meritless applications |
| Whether attempt convictions necessarily qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) because the substantive offense qualifies | Dissent (J. Jill Pryor): attempting a crime does not necessarily equate to attempting every elements‑clause use of force element | Panel: intent to commit every element for attempt conviction supports treating attempt as falling within the elements clause | Panel held attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery qualifies; dissenters urged reconsideration en banc but rehearing was denied |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018) (panel opinion affirming § 924(c) convictions and holding published three‑judge orders bind the Circuit)
- In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (published three‑judge order holding Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause)
- Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (addressing interpretive approaches to § 924(c) and related doctrines; decisional context relied upon in panel reasoning and dissents)
- In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2003) (establishing the Bennett/Holladay interpretation of ‘‘prima facie’’ as sufficient to warrant fuller exploration by the district court)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (Supreme Court decision invalidating ACCA residual clause and prompting numerous successive‑petition applications)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (U.S. 2016) (holding Johnson announced a new substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016) (panel applying sentencing‑record analysis in the successive‑petition context to conclude some Johnson‑based claims do not meet the prima facie standard)
- In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016) (published three‑judge order holding carjacking is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A))