United States v. Michael St. Hubert
909 F.3d 335
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Michael St. Hubert pled guilty to two § 924(c) counts charging use/brandishing of a firearm in relation to a Hobbs Act robbery (Count 8) and an attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count 12); plea incorporated the substantive Hobbs Act predicates (Counts 7 and 11).
- At plea colloquy St. Hubert admitted brandishing a gun, threatening employees, taking ~$2,300 in one robbery, and in the attempted robbery holding a gun to an employee and fleeing when police arrived.
- Before pleading, St. Hubert moved to dismiss the § 924(c) counts arguing Hobbs Act robbery (and attempt) are not "crimes of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements/use-of-force) and that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson/Dimaya.
- The district court denied dismissal; St. Hubert pleaded guilty and was sentenced (84 months on Count 8; 300 months consecutive on Count 12) and timely appealed.
- On appeal the panel considered waiver by guilty plea (distinguishing constitutional and statutory challenges), applied the Eleventh Circuit en banc decision in Ovalles II, and assessed both § 924(c)(3) definitions for the Hobbs Act robbery and attempted robbery predicates.
Issues
| Issue | St. Hubert’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a guilty plea waived St. Hubert’s constitutional challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) | The plea does not bar a constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction | Guilty plea waived challenges; but Class allows constitutional challenges to statute of conviction | Not waived; under Class plea does not bar the constitutional claim |
| Whether a guilty plea waived St. Hubert’s statutory claim that Hobbs Act robbery/attempt do not qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) | The claim is jurisdictional (indictment alleged only non-offenses) and therefore not waivable | The challenge is non-jurisdictional (indictment alleged a federal statute) and therefore waived | Not waived; following Peter/Meacham, an indictment that affirmatively alleges conduct outside the statute is jurisdictional and not waived |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness after Johnson/Dimaya | Residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and cannot support convictions | § 924(c)(3)(B) is saved by a conduct-based interpretation (Ovalles II) | Clause upheld under Ovalles II’s conduct-based construction; St. Hubert’s admitted conduct fits the residual clause |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery categorically qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Hobbs Act "fear of injury" language can encompass non-physical, non-threatening conduct and thus fails the elements (categorical) test; attempt likewise may criminalize preparatory conduct lacking force | Precedent (Saint Fleur, Colon, and other circuits) treats Hobbs Act robbery (and attempt) as crimes of violence—intimidation/fear requires threatened physical force; attempted offenses include attempted force | Affirmed: Hobbs Act robbery and attempted robbery qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) categorically; alternatively both qualify under § 924(c)(3)(B) based on admitted conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (adopts conduct-based approach to § 924(c)(3)(B) and upholds residual clause)
- Saint Fleur v. United States, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (treats Hobbs Act robbery as crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A))
- In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A))
- Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (a voluntary, unconditional guilty plea does not by itself waive a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute of conviction)
- United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (defects in an indictment generally do not deprive court of jurisdiction; limited to omissions from indictment)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (void-for-vagueness holding applied to ACCA residual clause; principal basis for constitutional vagueness challenges)
- Dimaya v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applies vagueness analysis to a residual clause in immigration statute)