United States v. Michael Norwood
49f4th189
3rd Cir.
2022

Background

  • In April 1996 Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which (unlike the earlier Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA)) made restitution mandatory, changed enforcement mechanisms, and extended restitution liability to the later of 20 years after judgment or 20 years after release from imprisonment.
  • Michael Norwood committed federal robberies in April 1996, was sentenced in May 1997, and ordered to pay $19,562.87 restitution; the VWPA governed his restitution because the conduct predated the MVRA.
  • Norwood’s judgment was modified multiple times via §2255 proceedings and resentencings (1999, 2012–2013), but the district courts repeatedly stated that the restitution obligation remained undisturbed.
  • The Government sought turnover of funds from Norwood’s inmate account in 2016; the district court authorized collection in 2020, relying on MVRA enforcement provisions and tax-collection analogies to justify continuing collection after the VWPA 20-year window would have expired (May 30, 2017).
  • The Third Circuit held the VWPA’s 20-year lien/ liability period ran from Norwood’s original 1997 judgment and that the VWPA did not authorize continued enforcement by tolling via tax-collection provisions; applying the MVRA retroactively to extend liability would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, so the collection order was reversed.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Norwood) Defendant's Argument (Government) Held
Whether the VWPA’s 20-year liability period became unenforceable on May 30, 2017, or whether a timely pre-expiration collection action preserved/enabled continued enforcement VWPA lien became unenforceable after 20 years; a pre-expiration motion does not preserve lien because VWPA did not incorporate §6502(a) Timely collection proceedings tolled/extended enforcement under tax-collection analogies so Government could continue collection Held for Norwood: VWPA lien became unenforceable; district court erred to rely on MVRA/§6502(a) to permit post-expiration collection
Whether Norwood’s 2013 amended judgment reset the VWPA 20-year liability period 2013 resentencing did not disturb the original 1997 restitution lien; the 20-year period runs from the original judgment The 2013 amended judgment is the operative judgment and restarts the 20-year clock Held for Norwood: 1997 judgment controls; §2255-based resentencings did not, and courts lacked jurisdiction in habeas to alter restitution, so lien was not reset
Whether retroactive application of the MVRA to extend Norwood’s liability violates the Ex Post Facto Clause Retroactive MVRA application increases punishment (longer liability, more interest, broader collection window and collateral consequences) and thus violates Ex Post Facto as-applied MVRA is remedial/ enforcement-oriented (or akin to a limitations rule); retroactive application does not create a significant risk of increased punishment Held for Norwood: retroactive application would increase punishment and thus violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
Whether the MVRA’s enforcement provisions (treating restitution liens like tax liabilities) applied to Norwood’s VWPA-based lien VWPA did not incorporate the MVRA’s §3613(c)/tax-collection mechanism at time of offense; Government cannot retroactively import those enforcement tools MVRA’s enforcement provisions should govern and permit use of tax-collection tolling mechanisms Held for Norwood: MVRA enforcement mechanisms cannot be retroactively applied to Norwood’s VWPA lien

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998) (MVRA applied retroactively to sentencing events and distinguished VWPA treatment)
  • Loughman v. Consol.-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 1993) (post-judgment interest and related calculations run from the entry date of the judgment that established liability)
  • United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (sentencing-package doctrine governs when de novo resentencing is appropriate for interdependent sentences)
  • Lesko v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 34 F.4th 211 (3d Cir. 2022) (resentencing can create a new judgment as to counts for which sentence was altered)
  • Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (new intervening judgments affect habeas second-or-successive analysis)
  • Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000) (Ex Post Facto analysis asks whether a change creates a significant risk of increased punishment)
  • Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2003) (changes affecting parole criteria can violate Ex Post Facto by increasing time actually served)
  • Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (statutory deadlines in restitution context do not always carry disabling consequences; analysis depends on statute's text)
  • North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (Double Jeopardy requires credit for punishment already suffered on resentencing)
  • Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005) (restitution is a criminal penalty when imposed as part of sentence)
  • United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) (restitution ordered as part of a criminal sentence is criminal, not civil, in nature)
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