United States v. Michael Montgomery, 491 F. App'x 683

Flint, Michigan police executed a search warrant at 3072 Roanoke Street; Montgomery ran and was tackled in a bathroom, and crack and marijuana were recovered.
Firearms were found under a chair cushion, along with drug scales and packaging materials in the Roanoke residence; cash was found on Montgomery.
Montgomery gave a post-arrest interview after Miranda waiver, and provided a handwritten statement taking responsibility for the drugs and guns.
A first superseding indictment added a possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine count based on Roanoke seizure; prior firearm possession count remained.
At trial, the government presented officers including an expert on drug distribution; Montgomery challenged suppression and sufficiency of evidence.
The district court denied suppression; Montgomery was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 190 months; appeals followed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the statement coerced and suppressible?	Montgomery contends coercive police conduct tainted the statement.	State argues no coercion; confession voluntary based on credibility.	No coercion; statement voluntary; denial of suppression affirmed.
Is there sufficient evidence of constructive possession of firearms?	Proximity and control justified constructive possession.	Insufficient evidence beyond near proximity to firearms.	Sufficient circumstantial evidence, including confession and residence control.
Is there sufficient evidence of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine?	Evidence like scales, packaging, large seizure, and admission supports intent.	Small quantity could be personal use; insufficient to show intent.	Reasonable jury could find intent to distribute based on totality of circumstances.
Was the expert drug-distribution testimony properly admitted under Rule 704(b)?	Officer’s expert aids jury in understanding drug-dealing methods.	Testimony improperly invaded juror’s determinations of intent.	Properly admitted with cautionary instruction; did not usurp jury function.
Was the pre-indictment delay warranting dismissal under due process?	Delay prejudiced defense by witness unavailability and timing.	Delay speculative prejudice; plea negotiations and other factors explain delay.	No due process violation; delay not shown substantial prejudice.

United States v. Jenkins, 593 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2010) (constructive possession can attach through dominion over premises)
United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007) (proximity plus incriminating evidence supports possession)
United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2005) (continued possession considerations for firearms)
United States v. Whitehead, 415 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005) (evidence and inferences support intent determinations)
United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1999) (circumstantial evidence supports distribution intent)
United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2008) (credibility determinations reviewed deferentially on suppression)
Lopez-Medina v. United States, 461 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006) (police officer expert testimony admissible with cautionary instruction)
United States v. Wrice, 954 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1992) (no irresistible coercion shown in interrogation)