United States v. Michael Maynes, Jr.
880 F.3d 110
| 4th Cir. | 2018Background
- Michael Maynes ran a pimping/prostitution operation in Virginia and was charged with conspiracy and multiple counts of sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (force, fraud, or coercion) based on four women he recruited and exploited.
- Victims were lured by promises (homes, income, help with children) or romantic pretense; once working for Maynes, they were restricted, deprived of funds, provided drugs, and coerced via control over children and threats.
- Indictment: conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, five § 1591(a) counts, and one kidnapping count; jury acquitted on one trafficking count and kidnapping, convicted on conspiracy and four trafficking counts.
- Sentence: concurrent 420-month terms, $100 special assessment per count, five years’ supervised release, and $405,400 restitution.
- On appeal, Maynes challenged the district court’s jury instruction on “fraud,” the exclusion of sexual-history cross-examination, sufficiency of the evidence, and sought review of ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Maynes' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction on “fraud” under § 1591(a) | The district court should have instructed that fraud requires a material misrepresentation; omission allowed conviction for immaterial lies | The given instruction tracked the statute and, when read with other instructions, necessarily required misrepresentations that could be used to cause commercial sex (i.e., material) | Instruction adequate; materiality implicit in context; Maynes’ proposed wording misleading and partly incorrect |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for § 1591 convictions | Evidence was insufficient to prove elements of trafficking and causation | Evidence supported each element; jury could credit victims over defendant | Convictions upheld; viewed under rational-trier-of-fact standard |
| Exclusion of victims’ sexual-history evidence (Confrontation Clause) | Cross-examination limitation prevented showing victims’ prior prostitution and knowledge of the trade, undermining defense | District court acted within discretion to limit marginally relevant, prejudicial, or confusing inquiry to avoid a mini-trial | No abuse of discretion; limits consistent with Van Arsdall; some history was permitted but excluded where probative value outweighed by prejudice |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (raised on appeal) | Trial counsel’s performance was inadequate | Ineffective-assistance claims are normally not resolved on direct appeal; record does not show counsel fell below Strickland standard | Denied on direct appeal; no record basis to find deficiency |
Key Cases Cited
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (fraud requires misrepresentation or concealment of material fact)
- Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012) (verdict overturned for insufficiency only if no rational trier of fact could agree)
- United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2014) (§ 1591 crime complete without actual commercial sex act having occurred)
- United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) (same principle regarding § 1591)
- United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2010) (same principle regarding § 1591)
- United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross-examination but allows reasonable limits)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (same principle on cross-examination limits)
- United States v. Gemma, 818 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (prior prostitution evidence often irrelevant or of slight probative value in § 1591 cases)
- United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2015) (victim’s sex-industry experience not necessarily relevant to coercion question)
- United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 2015) (prior or subsequent prostitution generally irrelevant to whether defendant used force/coercion)
- United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2012) (prior prostitution does not negate deception or coercion claims)
- United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1997) (generally do not resolve ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)