United States v. Michael Lindsey
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11752
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Lindsey was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); sentencing proceeded under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
- The indictment and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) listed three prior Minnesota second-degree assault convictions (1996, 2007, 2011) plus other convictions; the PSR concluded Lindsey qualified as an armed career criminal.
- Lindsey timely filed objections to the PSR within the 14-day Rule 32(f) window, but those objections attacked only the legal characterization of the priors as ACCA predicates, not the fact of the convictions.
- Forty-four days after the PSR Lindsey filed a Position Regarding Sentencing that, for the first time, disputed the fact of the prior convictions; he did not request leave to file late objections or an evidentiary hearing.
- The district court treated the PSR’s undisputed facts as established, held Minnesota second-degree assault falls within the ACCA "elements clause," applied ACCA, and sentenced Lindsey to 262 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Lindsey's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred in adopting PSR criminal-history facts without further proof | Lindsey: He properly objected to the fact of his prior convictions and they were not proven | Gov't: Lindsey did not timely object to the fact of the convictions, so the PSR facts were undisputed | Held: Lindsey’s challenges to the fact of convictions were untimely; district court may adopt PSR facts absent timely specific objection |
| Whether Minnesota second-degree assault qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" under the elements clause | Lindsey: Statute can cover non-forceful means (poison, scalding water, radiation), so it lacks a categorical force element | Gov't: Minnesota assault (including assault-fear and assault-harm formulations) requires threatened, attempted, or actual physical force and thus fits the ACCA elements clause | Held: Minnesota second-degree assault requires use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force and qualifies as an ACCA predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jokhoo, 806 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for guidelines and factual findings)
- United States v. May, 413 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2005) (district court may accept undisputed PSR facts as true)
- United States v. Richey, 758 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2014) (PSR is not substantive evidence for contested facts)
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (no collateral attack on prior convictions used for sentencing enhancements)
- United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2009) (de novo review whether a prior conviction is an ACCA violent felony)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (indirect causation can satisfy elements requiring physical force)
- United States v. Schaffer, 818 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2016) (Minnesota assault language qualifies under ACCA elements clause)