United States v. Michael J. Muzio
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13061
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Michael Muzio was convicted in the S.D. Fla. and on July 1, 2010 the district court entered a judgment sentencing him to 163 months imprisonment and stated restitution would be ordered but deferred the amount (90 days) in the July Judgment.
- Muzio filed a timely notice of appeal (within 14 days) from the July Judgment. The district court later (Nov. 3, 2010) adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation fixing restitution, directed the government to submit an amended final judgment, but no amended judgment was ever entered.
- The jurisdictional question: whether an initial sentencing judgment that imposes imprisonment but defers the restitution amount is sufficiently "final" for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
- Under pre-Dolan Eleventh Circuit law (Maung/Kapelushnik), an appeal was premature until restitution was ordered or the court lost power (previously deemed to occur at 90 days); Dolan held district courts retain power after 90 days, disrupting that ripening rule.
- The majority holds that a judgment imposing imprisonment is "sufficiently final" for appeal even if restitution amount is deferred, relying on Supreme Court precedent and practical concerns about indefinite deprivation of appellate review; it affirms Muzio’s convictions and sentence on the merits.
- The dissent argues the July Judgment was provisional because sentencing remained unfinished (restitution + required Rule 32/Rule 43 presence), so no final judgment existed and the court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Muzio) | Defendant's Argument (United States / Court majority view) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a sentencing judgment that imposes imprisonment but defers the restitution amount is "final" for purposes of appellate jurisdiction | July Judgment was not final because restitution was deferred and district court retained jurisdiction; appeal was premature | A judgment that imposes imprisonment is "freighted with sufficient indicia of finality" to support immediate appeal; allowing appeal prevents indefinite deprivation of review | Held: Judgment imposing imprisonment is immediately appealable even if restitution amount is deferred; appellate jurisdiction exists |
| Whether pre-Dolan ripening rule (Kapelushnik/Maung — 90-day rule) controls | Reliance on Kapelushnik/Maung means appeal ripens only after restitution ordered or court loses power | Dolan abrogates the 90-day deprivation-of-power premise; Kapelushnik framework creates indefinite delay post-Dolan and cannot govern | Held: Dolan undermines the Kapelushnik ripening rule; may not be applied to deny appealability |
| Whether permitting immediate appeals causes improper piecemeal litigation or divests district court of needed authority to adjust sentences after restitution | Piecemeal appeals and split jurisdiction are undesirable; district court should finish sentencing before appeal; defendant entitled to presence at restitution hearing | Practicalities and precedent (Corey, Berman, Korematsu) favor protecting a defendant’s right to timely review despite potential bifurcation; § 3664(o)/§ 3582 show Congress accepts modification post-judgment | Held: Risk of piecemeal litigation is outweighed by the need to avoid indefinite denial of appellate review; district court may still address restitution and amended judgments later |
| Whether Muzio’s specific procedural defects (absence at restitution proceedings, lack of amended judgment) preclude jurisdiction or relief | Defect in restitution process (no presence, no Rule 32 colloquy) means sentencing unfinished; November orders were not a final judgment; appellate court lacks jurisdiction | These restitution-process defects do not negate that the July Judgment imposing imprisonment was final for appeal; Muzio may separately appeal restitution later | Held: Court exercised jurisdiction over July Judgment and resolved claims on merits; did not decide finality of November order and left restitution-related issues unaddressed on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (district court retains power to order restitution after statutory 90-day deadline; dicta favor appealability of initial sentencing judgments that defer restitution amount)
- Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 (1963) (initial order committing defendant to custody for study was sufficiently final to permit immediate appeal because imprisonment had been imposed)
- Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937) ("Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence; the sentence is the judgment")
- Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943) (discipline such as probation can make a judgment appealable)
- Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940) (interlocutory review is limited; courts should avoid denying review only when finality rule would wholly defeat right to review)
- Kapelushnik v. United States, 306 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir.) (pre-Dolan Eleventh Circuit rule that appeals from judgments deferring restitution ripen at restitution order or when court loses power)
- Maung v. United States, 267 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir.) (interpreted § 3664(d)(5) to make district court lose power after 90 days; later abrogated by Dolan)
- Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989) (practicalities may justify relaxing jurisdictional formalities to avoid needless procedural games)