United States v. Michael Henry
983 F.3d 214
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Michael Henry was convicted of three bank robberies and three §924(c) firearm counts; after retrial and appeals his case underwent multiple sentencings and resentencings.
- At various points the district court imposed lengthy consecutive §924(c) mandatory minima (five years for the first §924(c) and 25 years for each additional), producing an aggregate §924(c) minimum of 55 years under the pre-First Step Act law.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed some §924(c) convictions (Rosemond) and later remanded a separate limited resentencing in light of Dean v. United States to allow the district court to consider §924(c) mandatory minima when setting robbery sentences.
- Congress enacted the First Step Act §403 in December 2018, changing §924(c) so that the elevated consecutive minimums apply only when a prior §924(c) conviction is final, and making that amendment applicable to “any offense ... if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.”
- Henry’s limited remand occurred before the First Step Act but his eventual resentencing took place after enactment; the district court held §403 did not apply and reimposed the pre-Act stacked minima, prompting this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Henry) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether First Step Act §403 applies at resentencing after a limited appellate remand issued before the Act but resentencing held after enactment | §403 applies only where no prior sentence had been imposed as of enactment; Henry had “a sentence” for §924(c) when Congress enacted the Act, so §403 does not apply | Because the limited remand meant no final sentence had been imposed for the purposes of §403(b), Henry was an unsentenced defendant at enactment and is eligible for §403 relief | Reversed: §403 applies at Henry’s resentencing; remand for resentencing under §403 (majority opinion) |
| Meaning of “a sentence” and “imposed” in §403(b) — do they refer to any prior sentence or to a currently valid sentence at enactment? | “A sentence” includes prior sentences (even if subject to appellate proceedings); “imposed” occurred at initial district sentencing | §403(b) refers to whether a valid sentence existed at enactment; a sentence vacated or functionally undone by remand is not “imposed” for §403 purposes | Court reads “a sentence” and “imposed” to mean a valid sentence at the time of enactment; Henry had no such imposed sentence at that time, so §403 applies |
| Scope of a limited remand — whether a limited remand that required consideration of §924(c) minima allowed district court to revisit §924(c) sentencing under §403 | Limited remand preserves previously imposed §924(c) sentence; remand only permitted consideration of §924(c) minima when setting predicate counts, not reopening §924(c) sentencing | The limited remand necessarily required the district court to reexamine §924(c) sentences to set overall sentence and therefore allowed application of §403 at resentencing | Majority: limited remand here was broad enough to permit reimposition under the post-Act rule; dissent: limited remand left a §924(c) sentence in place and §403 therefore inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (clarified intent required for aiding-and-abetting §924(c))
- Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (district courts may consider §924(c) mandatory minima when sentencing on predicate counts)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (retroactivity principles for ameliorative sentencing statutes)
- United States v. Franklin, 499 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2007) (prior Sixth Circuit rule limiting consideration of §924(c) minima at predicate sentencing)
- United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020) (First Step Act §403 inapplicable where defendant had been sentenced before enactment and appeal was pending)
- United States v. Uriarte, 975 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (First Step Act §403 applies when sentence vacated and defendant was unsentenced at enactment)
- United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act §403 does not apply where a §924(c) sentence had been imposed prior to enactment and remand concerned unrelated territorial counts)
- United States v. Foreman, 958 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing varied uses of “impose” in sentencing contexts)
- United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2019) (interpreting an analogous First Step Act provision)