United States v. Michael Harvel, 115 F.4th 714

Michael Harvel, Director of Cumberland County’s Solid Waste Department, sexually assaulted several women under his supervision between 2014–2017.
Many victims were performing court-ordered community service work and were reluctant to report his actions due to fear and their criminal records.
Harvel was charged and convicted on 9 counts under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depriving victims of their constitutional rights, some aggravated by kidnapping or sexual abuse.
On appeal, Harvel raised claims relating to timeliness of indictment, sufficiency of the indictment, and the admissibility of certain evidence.
The district court sentenced Harvel to 204 months’ imprisonment, and he appealed the conviction on several grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statute of Limitations under § 3281	Charges for certain counts were untimely; only offenses punishable by death are exempt from 5-year limit, and Eighth Amendment forbids death penalty for nonhomicides	No, offenses were "punishable by death" under § 242 and thus no statute of limitations, regardless of Eighth Amendment limits	Counts fell under the no-limitations rule because § 242 allows for a death sentence regardless of Eighth Amendment constraints
Due Process—Delay in Prosecution	Delay violated due process; key witnesses died, harming defense	Delay due to investigation and COVID-19; no bad faith or tactical delay	No due process violation; Harvel failed to show deliberate delay by prosecution or actual prejudice
Sufficiency of Indictment	Indictment failed to properly allege “under color of law” as required by § 242	Indictment tracked statute, described Harvel’s position, duties, and conduct	Indictment was sufficient; included required statutory elements and factual detail
Admission of “Other Acts” Evidence	Rule 413 violates due process by allowing propensity evidence; and Rule 403 required exclusion due to unfair prejudice	Rule 413 permits such evidence in sex crimes; Rule 403 balancing was proper	Admission of "other acts" evidence was constitutional and not unfairly prejudicial; district court did not abuse discretion

United States v. Briggs, 592 U.S. 69 (2020) ("Punishable by death" in federal limitations statutes refers to statutory penalty provisions, not constitutional viability of that penalty)
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for rape of an adult woman)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (Admission of evidence of other bad acts as intent/motive does not typically violate due process)
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (General rule against using propensity evidence in criminal cases)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial right generally not triggered until arrest or indictment)
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (Due process limits on evidence admission are narrow; rules of evidence generally control)
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (Due process only bars practices that offend fundamental principles of justice)