United States v. Michael Hamilton
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23143
| 4th Cir. | 2012Background
- Hamilton was convicted on four counts: false statements to the VA for PTSD benefits, theft of VA funds, wearing a military uniform without authorization, and wearing unearned military medals without authorization.
- The false statements and theft convictions stemmed from Hamilton’s May 1997 and later PTSD-related benefit claims, based on fabricated Vietnam service and PTSD symptoms.
- Hamilton’s PTSD diagnosis and increased disability benefits were obtained in part through Dr. Chorley’s evaluation, which relied on Hamilton’s false statements about combat experiences.
- At a 2010 Vietnam Veterans’ Recognition Ceremony, Hamilton wore a colonel’s uniform with numerous unearned medals, after prior on-base incidents of impersonating officers.
- The district court imposed concurrent sentences (two 16-month terms for false statements and theft, plus shorter terms for insignia offenses) and restitution of $37,635 to the VA.
- On appeal, Hamilton challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the false statements and theft convictions, and the insignia statutes’ constitutionality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 1001(a)(2). | Hamilton argues evidence insufficient for knowing false statements. | Hamilton contends statements to Dr. Chorley were not material or knowingly false. | Substantial evidence supports knowingly false statements |
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 641 theft. | Evidence shows intent to obtain benefits through deceit. | Benefit award may be related to factors other than false statements. | Substantial evidence supports theft conviction |
| Constitutionality of § 702 and § 704(a) as applied and facially. | Insignia statutes regulate conduct without suppressing speech; facial validity and as-applied validity are questioned. | Statutes are overly broad under First Amendment and should be struck or narrowly construed. | Limiting construction with intent to deceive sustains constitutionality; statutes survive facial and applied challenges under Johnson/Alvarez framework |
| Appropriate First Amendment scrutiny for insignia statutes. | O’Brien relatively lenient scrutiny should apply. | Johnson most exacting scrutiny should apply because of expressive conduct. | Assumes Johnson standard applies and upholds statutes under the most exacting scrutiny |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011) (expressive-conduct vs. pure-speech distinctions; Alvarez's implications for §704(b) not controlling here)
- Perelman, 658 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (limiting construction requiring intent to deceive for §704 and §702; later amended opinion)
- United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1968) (establishes conduct-regulation framework (O’Brien test) for expressive conduct)
- Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1989) (most exacting scrutiny when regulation suppresses expressive conduct; not always applicable)
- Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1988) (defines strict scrutiny standard for compelling state interests)
- United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 1998) (materiality and evidentiary standards for § 1001)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (U.S. 2008) (statutory interpretation and scope in context of 18 U.S.C. § 1001)
- United States v. Littleton, 76 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 1996) (materiality standard for falsity in § 1001 contexts)
- Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (U.S. 1988) (materiality standard in false-statement prosecutions)
