844 F.3d 613
6th Cir.2016Background
- Michael Grundy, a Wayne County official, pleaded guilty to one count of honest-services wire fraud (HealthChoice–Medtrix scheme) as part of a plea agreement that dismissed other charges.
- The plea agreement included an appeal waiver: Grundy waived any right to appeal his sentence if the sentence did not exceed a specified maximum (210 months), a figure tied to the government’s proposed Guidelines range based on a $1M–$2.5M loss estimate.
- At sentencing the court adopted the government’s Guidelines calculations (with one irrelevant adjustment), sentenced Grundy to 90 months, and deferred restitution determination to the court.
- After negotiations failed, the government sought $1,380,767 in restitution for losses from three related schemes; the district court ordered that amount over Grundy’s objection that restitution should be limited to $400,000 (the loss tied to the convicted scheme).
- Grundy appealed the restitution order; the government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the plea agreement’s waiver. The Sixth Circuit considered whether the appeal waiver barred appellate review of restitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an appeal waiver that bars appeals of a defendant's "sentence" precludes appellate review of a restitution order | Government: the waiver bars appeals of restitution because restitution is part of the sentence | Grundy: the waiver was tied to imprisonment exposure and did not knowingly waive appellate review of restitution or its calculation | Waived: the court held the waiver bars appeals of restitution; restitution is part of the sentence and was encompassed by the waiver |
| Whether disputing Guidelines/loss in district court preserves appellate review of restitution | Government: contesting restitution in district court does not preserve appellate rights when plea expressly waived appeals | Grundy: his district-court challenges show he did not intend to waive appellate review of restitution | Rejected: district-court challenges do not imply intent to preserve appellate review absent explicit reservation |
| Whether the term "sentence" in the plea refers only to imprisonment | Grundy: language tying waiver to a months cap shows it referred only to imprisonment | Government: plea’s "Sentence" section included restitution and other components; context shows a holistic meaning | Rejected: "sentence" includes all constituent parts (imprisonment, restitution, etc.) |
| Whether policy considerations (e.g., preventing district-court whim) should invalidate the appeal waiver | Grundy: enforcing waiver is unfair and yields unchecked district-court power | Government: policy cannot override clear, freely made plea terms | Rejected: court enforces the clear, voluntary plea agreement; policy concerns do not overcome plain language |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Winans, 748 F.3d 268 (6th Cir. 2014) (appeal waiver that covered "sentence" barred appeal of restitution)
- United States v. Gibney, 519 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2008) (restitution is part of a defendant's sentence under the statutory scheme)
- United States v. Curry, [citation="547 F. App'x 768"] (6th Cir. 2013) (reservation to challenge restitution in district court indicates defendant knew restitution was part of sentence and could have preserved appellate rights)
- United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2005) (restitution statutes do not specify a statutory maximum)
- United States v. Villareal, 491 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2007) (plea agreements are subject to traditional principles of interpretation)
- United States v. Beals, 698 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2012) (courts must give effect to the plain language of plea agreements)
- United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2015) (rejection of Freeman's premise regarding a restitution statutory maximum)