United States v. Michael Clark
935 F.3d 558
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Michael Clark was arrested in a hotel (Room 203) and convicted for possession of a heroin/fentanyl mixture after police executed a warrant and found ~82 grams, a scale, and packaging.
- Investigator Todd Maas’s warrant affidavit relied heavily on a confidential informant’s tip (second‑hand) plus Maas’s surveillance observations and a tip from a "mom on a mission."
- Maas’s affidavit omitted adverse credibility information about the informant (payment, pending charges, 15 prior convictions, substance abuse, hope for sentence reduction).
- Clark moved for a Franks hearing (alleging deliberate/reckless omission) and to suppress (arguing the search may have occurred before the warrant was issued based on a photo clock); the district court denied both without evidentiary hearings.
- Clark appealed denial of Franks hearing and suppression hearing, and raised sentencing challenges: (1) whether a later Illinois drug conviction should be treated as relevant conduct (affecting concurrent v. consecutive sentencing), and (2) whether a supervised‑release condition banning contact with gang "affiliates" was unconstitutionally vague.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Clark made a sufficient preliminary showing to obtain a Franks hearing (omission of informant credibility) | Clark: Maas omitted materially damaging facts about the informant that would have undermined probable cause; omissions were intentional or reckless | Government/District Ct: Independent corroboration in affidavit (Maas’s observations, cash/one‑night rental, mother’s tip) made informant credibility non‑material | Court: Vacated conviction and remanded for a Franks evidentiary hearing; omissions were sufficiently material and permit inference of deliberate/reckless omission to justify a hearing |
| Whether Clark was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on suppression based on photo of clock suggesting search preceded warrant | Clark: Photo clock at 8:15 p.m. showed search occurred before warrant issuance, so suppression hearing needed | Government: Camera metadata shows photos were taken after warrant; Clark offered only internet results about metadata alteration, not affidavits or factual assertions | Court: Affirmed denial of suppression hearing; metadata (and lack of specific factual dispute/affidavit) defeated request for hearing |
| Whether Illinois drug conviction should be treated as relevant conduct (making sentences concurrent) | Clark: Illinois offense was part of same fentanyl trafficking course of conduct (procurement and sales) so should count as relevant conduct under §1B1.3 | Government: Offenses were separated by seven months, involved different buyers/quantities/locations — not same course of conduct; district court treated as criminal history and ran sentences consecutively | Court: Affirmed district court; Clark did not preserve the issue but even under plain‑error review no plain error — not enough similarity/temporal proximity to compel relevant‑conduct treatment |
| Whether supervised‑release condition banning contact with gang "affiliates" is unconstitutionally vague | Clark: Term "affiliate" is vague and thus unconstitutional | Government/District Ct: Condition proper; Clark did not object at sentencing | Court: Condition challenge waived under Flores; affirmed as waived (could be raised later in district court) |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (warrant invalid if affidavit contains deliberate/reckless falsehoods or omissions; defendant may obtain Franks hearing on preliminary showing)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause turns on totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2014) (standard for preliminary showing to obtain Franks hearing; credibility omissions may permit inference of recklessness)
- United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2016) (omission of informant credibility not material where independent corroboration from other reliable informant existed)
- United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (omitted adverse informant facts did not require Franks hearing where controlled buys and other corroboration existed)
- United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2016) (omission of informant background not material where affidavit contained extensive corroboration)
- United States v. Woods, 995 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993) (defendant must produce specific factual dispute to obtain suppression hearing where government explains timing discrepancies)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppressed impeachment evidence is material if reasonable probability it would affect outcome — cited for analogy on impeachment and materiality)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence in Brady context)
- United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019) (standards for waiver of supervised‑release condition challenges on appeal)