United States v. Michael Chaparro
956 F.3d 462
| 7th Cir. | 2020Background
- Michael Chaparro was indicted for three separate child-pornography offenses: viewing images on a Compaq desktop hard drive (July 30, 2013), transmitting images via BitTorrent to an undercover detective (August 7, 2014), and viewing images on an LG smartphone (November 24, 2014).
- Law enforcement executed a search warrant at Chaparro’s grandparents’ home on December 2, 2014; they seized a Compaq desktop (hard drive with child pornography) and an LG smartphone taken from Chaparro.
- Forensic evidence showed (a) the desktop contained downloaded child‑pornography files and search activity from July 2013, (b) the hard drive and the August 2014 BitTorrent activity both had the rare Tixati client and pieces of the same torrent, and (c) the smartphone had thumbnails and searches from November 24, 2014 plus a text message identifying the user as “mike.”
- At a pretrial interview Chaparro told Pretrial Services he lived with his grandparents from December 2011 to December 2014; defense witness Eddie Ramos testified Chaparro did not live at that address until shortly before arrest.
- At trial the district court allowed the Pretrial Services officer to testify about Chaparro’s residence statement in rebuttal (over objection), treating it as impeachment; a jury convicted Chaparro on all three counts and he received concurrent 210‑month sentences. On appeal Chaparro challenged sufficiency of evidence, admission of the Pretrial Services statement, and prosecutor rebuttal remarks.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Chaparro was the user of the devices (Counts 1–3) | Forensics, device artifacts, user account name, Tixati overlap and propensity evidence support identity | Forensics point to a location/home, not a person; little direct proof Chaparro lived at the house before Dec 2014 | On plain‑error review the record was not devoid of evidence; sufficiency sustained at that standard (later two convictions reversed for separate evidentiary error) |
| Whether a defendant’s Pretrial Services statement may be used to impeach another witness by contradiction under 18 U.S.C. §3153(c)(3) | The statute bars statements only "on the issue of guilt," so an implied impeachment exception permits using pretrial statements for impeachment (including contradiction) | §3153(c)(3) makes pretrial statements inadmissible on guilt; using a defendant’s confidential statement to contradict another witness is substantive and thus barred | Court held it was legal error to admit Chaparro’s Pretrial Services statement for impeachment by contradiction; that admission violated the Act and was not harmless for Counts One and Three (those convictions reversed) but was harmless for Count Two |
| Whether prosecutor’s rebuttal remarks were improper enough to require a new trial | Prosecutor’s comments were permissible criticisms and did not shift the burden; jury was properly instructed | Remarks appealed to sympathy for law enforcement and disparaged defense tactics, potentially inflaming jurors | Some remarks were improper and excessive but not plain error given the strength of the smartphone evidence; Count Two conviction stands |
| Remedy after partial reversal (Counts One & Three reversed, Count Two affirmed) | Government may retry Counts One and Three or accept reversal and proceed to resentencing | Chaparro seeks new trial on reversed counts or resentencing on the remaining conviction | Counts One and Three are reversed; Count Two sentence vacated and case remanded for new trial on Counts One and Three and/or resentencing on Count Two consistent with decision |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Griffith, 385 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognized an impeachment exception permitting use of pretrial services statements for impeachment of the speaker)
- United States v. Perez, 473 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2006) (pretrial services evidence used to identify a defendant implicated the issue of guilt)
- United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1977) (analogous rule allowing impeachment of a testifying defendant with statements to a government psychiatrist)
- James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (impeachment exception to exclusionary rules is limited to testifying defendants, not all defense witnesses)
- Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) (suppressed evidence may be used to impeach a testifying defendant)
- United States v. Zuniga, 767 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2014) (harmless‑error doctrine: error is harmless if other untainted evidence is overwhelming)