United States v. Michael Brown
879 F.3d 1043
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Michael N. Brown pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)).
- At sentencing the district court treated Brown’s 2005 Washington conviction for conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine (RCW §§ 69.50.401(1), 69.50.407) as a "controlled substance offense," raising his base offense level to 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
- The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 63–78 months and sentenced Brown to 60 months; Brown appealed the Guidelines classification.
- Central legal question: whether the Washington drug-conspiracy statute is a categorical match to the federal (generic) conspiracy offense used to define "controlled substance offense" under the Guidelines.
- Washington’s general conspiracy statute (RCW § 9A.28.040) contains subsection (2)(f), creating an explicit rule that it is not a defense that the alleged coconspirator was a law enforcement officer who did not intend the crime—raising the possibility Washington law criminalizes a unilateral agreement that federal law does not.
- The Ninth Circuit held § 69.50.407 incorporates the general conspiracy definition (including subsection (2)(f)), so the Washington statute is broader than the federal generic conspiracy and therefore is not a categorical match; the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown’s WA drug-conspiracy conviction qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) | Government: WA drug-conspiracy statute is a categorical match to federal conspiracy (so it counts) | Brown: WA statute is overbroad because it allows conviction where the only coconspirator is a government agent who lacks criminal intent | Held: Not a categorical match; conviction does not qualify as a controlled substance offense |
| Whether RCW § 69.50.407 incorporates the general conspiracy definition (including § 9A.28.040(2)(f)) | Government: § 69.50.407 stands alone and does not broaden conspiracy liability; more specific statute governs | Brown: § 9A.04.010(2) makes Title 9A definitions (including subsection (2)(f)) applicable to Title 69 offenses | Held: § 69.50.407 incorporates the general conspiracy definition; subsection (2)(f) applies and renders the statute broader than the federal generic offense |
| Proper standard of review for categorical-question | Government: (implicit) apply normal sentencing review | Brown: categorical-match questions are legal and reviewed de novo | Held: De novo review applies to whether a prior conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the categorical approach |
| Whether the district court’s Guidelines error was harmless | Government: Any error was harmless; sentence would have been the same | Brown: Error affected Guidelines range and sentencing calculus | Held: Error was not harmless; remand for resentencing required |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes the categorical approach to prior convictions)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (discusses divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Martinez-Lopez, 864 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. en banc) (explains categorical-match principle in the Ninth Circuit)
- United States v. Hernandez, 769 F.3d 1059 (per curiam) (statute broader than generic offense cannot count)
- United States v. Lo, 447 F.3d 1212 (conspiracy cannot be proved by agreement with a government informer under federal law)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (realistic-probability test for overbreadth under the categorical approach)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (district court must correctly calculate Guidelines and use them as the starting point for sentencing)