United States v. Michael Bradford, 806 F.3d 1151

In 2012 Bradford sold drugs and firearms to an undercover storefront operation; he sold a Llama .38 revolver that ballistics later matched to the murder of David LaBlance on Oct. 30, 2012.
Bradford pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of drug distribution; the agreement contained an appeal waiver and a binding sentencing recommendation of 180–300 months.
The PSR applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 but did not apply the homicide cross‑reference in § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B); the government urged application of that cross‑reference to § 2A1.2 (second‑degree murder), which produced a higher advisory range.
Bradford moved ex parte for two subpoenas: (1) a subpoena ad testificandum compelling his father to testify about contact with Bradford on Oct. 30–31, 2012; and (2) a subpoena duces tecum for LaBlance’s medical records for the year preceding his death; both motions were denied.
At sentencing the district court accepted a proffer that Bradford spent much of Oct. 30 with family (not an alibi), heard government testimony linking Bradford to the murder, applied the § 2K2.1 cross‑reference to § 2A1.2, and sentenced Bradford to 300 months (the plea‑agreement maximum).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Enforceability of appeal waiver	Bradford contends his constitutional sentencing‑phase claims fall within the plea waiver’s carve‑outs ("illegal sentence") so appeal is permitted	Government argues the waiver bars this appeal; defines "illegal sentence" narrowly per Andis and says Bradford waived relief	Court: waiver language was not the same as Andis; government failed to show a clear, unambiguous waiver of these claims, so appeal proceeds
Denial of subpoenas under Rule 17 (compulsory process and due process)	Bradford argued Sixth and Fifth Amendment violation; needed father’s testimony and medical records to challenge cross‑reference and show alternative shooter/history	Government argued father’s testimony was unnecessary (proffer accepted) and medical records were speculative and insufficiently specified or relevant	Court: affirmed denial. Rule 17(b) not satisfied for witness (no specific necessity); Rule 17(c) subpoena for medical records was speculative, a mere hope, so denial was proper

United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard for enforcing appeal waivers)
United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (narrow "illegal sentence" exception to appeal waivers)
United States v. LeAmous, 754 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1985) (mere allegations of materiality insufficient for Rule 17 subpoenas)
United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2013) (Rule 17(c) requires specificity, relevance, admissibility)
United States v. Hang, 75 F.3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1996) (a subpoena should not issue on mere hope of favorable evidence)