United States v. Michael Barnes, 953 F.3d 383

Barnes pleaded guilty in 2013 to being a felon in possession of a firearm and, by plea agreement, waived the right to contest his conviction or sentence in any post‑conviction proceeding, including § 2255; he was sentenced under the ACCA to the 15‑year mandatory minimum.
In 2015 the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, holding ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutional.
About three months after Johnson, Barnes filed a § 2255 motion arguing his ACCA sentence was invalid; the government moved to dismiss based on (1) alternative ACCA predicates and (2) Barnes’s collateral‑review waiver.
The district court dismissed Barnes’s § 2255 motion as barred by his waiver and as untimely/procedurally barred; it denied a COA, but this court granted limited appellate review on waiver and timeliness questions.
The Fifth Circuit reversed none of the district court’s conclusions and held Barnes’s § 2255 petition was barred by the collateral‑review waiver; the appeal was dismissed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Barnes’s collateral‑review waiver bars his Johnson‑based § 2255 motion	Barnes: waiver unenforceable because Johnson was an unknown right when he waived collateral review	Government: waiver was knowing and voluntary and covers collateral § 2255 challenges	Waiver bars Barnes’s Johnson claim; a waiver need only be knowing, not "all‑knowing"
Whether a waiver can bar challenges based on a later‑decided constitutional rule	Barnes: cannot waive a right that did not exist at the time of the waiver	Government: prior Fifth Circuit precedent (Creadell Burns) permits waivers to cover rights premised on later decisions	Court follows Creadell Burns: waivers remain enforceable against claims arising from later decisions
Whether a waiver can be ignored when the sentence is alleged to be illegal/unconstitutional	Barnes: cannot waive the right to challenge an illegal or unconstitutional sentence	Government: only narrow exceptions exist (ineffective assistance, sentence exceeding statutory maximum), neither applies here	Waiver is enforceable; Barnes did not invoke applicable exceptions
Whether a "miscarriage of justice" exception defeats the waiver	Barnes: enforcing waiver would be patently unjust given Johnson relief available to others	Government: Barnes did not develop or properly invoke any miscarriage‑of‑justice standard	Court finds Barnes waived that argument by failing to develop it and declines to apply such an exception here

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Creadell Burns, 433 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2005) (appeal/collateral‑review waivers remain valid against claims based on later judicial decisions)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (a voluntary guilty plea intelligently made under then‑applicable law remains valid despite later changes)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (constitutional rule affecting sentencing guidelines)
United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2019) (recognized narrow exception regarding sentences exceeding statutory maximum)
United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) (refused to enforce waiver for claims that a sentence is illegal under Johnson)
United States v. McBride, 826 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2016) (addressed scope of waivers when Johnson‑type claims arise)
United States v. Morrison, 852 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2017) (enforced appellate waiver to bar Johnson challenge where waiver existed)
United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002) (ineffective‑assistance exception to waiver enforcement)
United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 1998) (government interest in finality and enforcement of plea bargains)