50 F.4th 81
11th Cir.2022Background
- Michael Conage was convicted of unlawful gun possession and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after the district court counted three prior "serious drug offenses," including a 2006 Florida conviction for trafficking under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)1.
- The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" to include possession with intent to distribute; federal courts apply the categorical approach, so the statutory elements of Florida's trafficking statute controlled whether the conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate.
- Section 893.135(1) lists six alternative means of trafficking (sell, purchase, manufacture, deliver, bring into state, possess constructively/actually) but does not define "purchase." Conage argued a purchase is complete on payment, without a possession element.
- The Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court whether a completed "purchase" under § 893.135(1) requires possession as federal law defines it (actual or constructive possession), because resolution affected the ACCA analysis.
- The Florida Supreme Court held that a completed purchase requires both (1) giving consideration and (2) obtaining control of a trafficking quantity, and that the requisite control is the same range of conduct that qualifies as constructive possession under federal law (including control via an agent).
- Following that answer, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Conage’s conviction and ACCA sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Conage) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "purchase" under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1) | "Purchase" requires payment and obtaining the drugs (consideration + control) | A purchase is complete upon payment; possession not required | Purchase requires both consideration and obtaining control (constructive possession) |
| Does a completed purchase satisfy "possession" for ACCA purposes? | Yes — the requisite control equals federal constructive possession (includes control through an agent) | No — paying completes purchase, so possession need not be proven | Yes — the control element required by Florida equals federal constructive possession, so purchase can be an ACCA predicate |
| Role of statutory context and interpretation canons | Use ordinary meaning, dictionary, statutory context (linked terms like "sell") to define "purchase" | Emphasizes common usage (e.g., payment completes purchase) and prior jury-instruction formulations | Court rejects isolating a narrow plain-meaning rule; uses textual and contextual analysis to adopt the United States' reading |
| Application of rule of lenity | Not necessary because statute is resolvable in favor of the United States' reading | Ambiguity favors defendant under Florida's strict-construction statute and lenity | Lenity not required; if interpretive tie existed, lenity would favor defendant, but court found United States' reading better |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) (Eleventh Circuit opinion that certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court)
- United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005) (possession of trafficking quantity implies intent to distribute)
- United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2009) (definition of constructive possession)
- United States v. Edwards, 166 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 1999) (constructive possession via agent/control other than direct physical control)
- Milazzo v. State, 377 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979) (in the chapter 893 context, delivery is an essential element of a sale)
- Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1983) (discussion of dominion, control, and knowledge as elements of constructive possession)