United States v. Michael Anthony Conage, 976 F.3d 1244

Defendant Michael Conage was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) of being a felon in possession; the PSR identified three prior state convictions (including a Florida § 893.135(1)(b)1. trafficking conviction) and the district court applied the ACCA 15‑year mandatory minimum.
The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as a state offense "involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute" a controlled substance (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)).
Florida Statute § 893.135(1)(b)1. defines trafficking in cocaine by six alternatives: selling, purchasing, manufacturing, delivering, bringing into the state, or knowingly possessing (28 grams or more).
Under the categorical approach, a multi‑alternative statute qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if each alternative necessarily "involves" the ACCA conduct; if any one alternative does not, the entire statute fails for ACCA purposes.
The dispositive question is whether the statutory alternative "purchasing" a trafficking quantity of cocaine necessarily involves possession (actual or constructive) with intent to distribute; Florida caselaw and the statute do not clearly define the elements of "purchase."
Because Florida law is unsettled on what the State must prove to convict for trafficking by purchase, the Eleventh Circuit declined to decide and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a Florida § 893.135(1)(b)1. conviction based on "purchasing" a trafficking quantity of cocaine qualifies as an ACCA "serious drug offense" (i.e., necessarily involves possession with intent to distribute).	Conage: "Purchasing" does not necessarily involve possession with intent to distribute; therefore the Florida statute cannot serve as an ACCA predicate because one statutory alternative (purchase) fails the ACCA test.	Government/District Court: Prior Eleventh Circuit precedent permits inferring intent from a trafficking‑quantity statutory scheme; purchase (as a completed transaction) would involve possession and thus satisfy the ACCA.	Eleventh Circuit: Florida law does not clearly define the elements of "purchase" under § 893.135(1); the court cannot determine whether purchase necessarily involves possession under Florida law and therefore certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.

Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (ACCA’s drug‑offense language describes conduct that a state offense must necessarily involve rather than requiring matching generic offense elements)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (categorical approach governs whether a prior conviction is a federal predicate)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (limits on modified categorical approach)
United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida trafficking by possession of threshold quantity may be treated as involving intent to distribute for ACCA)
United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016) (applied James to an Alabama trafficking statute; inferred intent to distribute from trafficking quantity)
United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (standard of review and categorical approach principles)
United States v. Shannon, 631 F.3d 1187 (11th Cir. 2011) (distinguishes Guidelines’ definition from ACCA; purchase not listed in Guidelines’ enumerated conduct)
Cintron v. United States Att’y Gen., 882 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 2018) (held modified categorical approach inapplicable to § 893.135(1) convictions)