United States v. Michael Alexander
680 F. App'x 388
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Michael Alexander pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and was sentenced as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines based on prior Ohio convictions including gross sexual imposition (Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.05).
- The Sixth Circuit previously affirmed his career-offender classification but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated that judgment, remanding for reconsideration in light of Mathis v. United States.
- The central question on remand was whether Ohio's gross sexual imposition statute categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (i.e., whether every conviction under the statute necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force).
- The court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches (Taylor/Descamps framework) to determine whether the statute is divisible and, if so, whether the particular statutory variant of the offense necessarily meets the Guidelines' force element.
- Ohio case law indicates that convictions under the gross sexual imposition statute can rest on subtle or psychological coercion without overt physical force, meaning the statute sweeps more broadly than the Guidelines' force definition.
- Holding: Because gross sexual imposition does not necessarily require physical force in all its variants, it does not qualify categorically as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a); the case is remanded for resentencing consistent with that determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ohio gross sexual imposition is a categorical "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) | Alexander argued his prior conviction did not necessarily involve physical force and thus should not serve as a career-offender predicate | Government argued the statute includes an element of "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" and thus qualifies as a crime of violence | The court held the statute does not categorically require physical force; it is not a crime-of-violence predicate and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether the modified categorical approach could be used to treat Alexander's conviction as violent | Alexander relied on case law showing non-physical coercion convictions under the statute to argue the offense does not always meet the force prong | Government relied on charging documents and the particular plea to argue Alexander's offense involved force | The court emphasized Descamps/Mathis limits on using the modified categorical approach; even with charging documents, the statute as a category sweeps beyond forcible conduct, so it fails to qualify |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (reaffirmed that courts must compare statutory elements, not underlying facts, and that divisible statutes require careful use of the modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explained distinction between categorical and modified categorical approaches and that courts may consult limited records for divisible statutes)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established the categorical approach for determining predicate offenses)
- United States v. Covington, 738 F.3d 759 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussed limits on using the modified categorical approach and the requirement that a statute must narrowly match the federal definition)
- United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 2014) (applied the categorical approach in sentencing/predicate-offense contexts)