United States v. Merritt, 945 F.3d 578

DEA Task Force Agent David Madore received a tip from reliable confidential informant Gary Hesketh that a caller wanted a ride from Boston's South Station to Lewiston, Maine, to bring a load of crack in exchange for transportation.
Madore deployed Hesketh and a second informant, Heidi Lemieux, to pick up the caller; Hesketh kept Madore apprised by calls/texts during the trip north.
Two Black men (later identified as Merritt and Artis) arrived at South Station, entered the vehicle, and the car proceeded toward Lewiston; law enforcement staged a traffic stop at Exit 75 of the Maine Turnpike.
Officers removed the two rear-seat passengers, used a drug-detection dog which alerted on Merritt and Artis (not the officer), and recovered crack on Artis; a packet of crack was later found concealed in Merritt at the county jail.
The district court found probable cause to arrest Merritt and Artis prior to the stop; it denied suppression and admitted co-conspirator statements; Artis pled guilty (preserving appeal); Merritt was tried and convicted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Were the defendants' seizure, removal, and dog sniff a constitutionally permissible stop or a de facto arrest requiring probable cause?	Police had probable cause before the stop based on a reliable CI, the arranged pickup, and corroborating travel information.	The stop/forcible removal and intrusive dog sniff were a de facto arrest that required (and lacked) probable cause.	Court: Probable cause existed to arrest before the stop; suppression denial affirmed.
2) Did the CI and surrounding facts supply probable cause as to both passengers?	The CI was reliable, offered drugs in exchange for a ride, the named pickup occurred, and both men arrived and traveled together—supporting probable cause for both.	Tip was inadequately corroborated; caller identity differed (not Mayo); no proof both were conspirators.	Court: Totality of circumstances supported probable cause; the identity difference did not defeat probable cause; argument waived in part.
3) Were out-of-court statements admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) or excluded under Rule 403 properly admitted?	Statements were made in furtherance of the drug venture; independent evidence supported a joint venture; admission proper.	Hearsay and unduly prejudicial; should have been excluded.	Court: District court did not err in admitting co‑conspirator statements and did not abuse discretion under Rule 403.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop-and-frisk standard; reasonable suspicion framework)
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (arrest/seizure must be supported by probable cause)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause assessed by totality of the circumstances)
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (probable cause assessed on totality; presumption when facts implicate multiple occupants)
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (probable cause inquiry looks to events leading up to arrest)
United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir. 1980) (procedure for provisional admission of co-conspirator statements)
United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (preservation rule for Petrozziello/co-conspirator hearsay challenges)
United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (co-conspirator statements admissible absent a conspiracy charge if independent evidence supports a joint venture)
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to lawful arrest doctrine)