United States v. Mercer
834 F.3d 39
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- On Sept. 20, 2013 police observed interactions between suspected drug trafficker Richard Magee and Craig Mercer at Ruski's restaurant; Magee entered Mercer's parked Saturn, conversed, briefly leaned into the car, handed a package to a bartender, spoke again with Mercer, and Mercer left without entering the restaurant. Officers later stopped Mercer's car, arrested him on outstanding warrants, and found ~2 ounces of cocaine.
- Mercer was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He moved to suppress the cocaine as the product of an unlawful stop; the District Court denied the motion and a jury convicted Mercer.
- Mercer was sentenced to 41 months (top of the Guidelines range based on offense level 18), with two Guideline enhancements applied: +2 for possession of a dangerous weapon (padlock in a bandana) and +2 for obstruction of justice (perjury). The court also discussed dismissed prior charges in sentencing.
- On appeal Mercer challenged: (1) the lawfulness of the stop (reasonable suspicion), (2) a late Rule 16 disclosure and the use of a rebuttal text message, (3) prosecution questioning about phone interactions (Sixth Amendment / evidence not in record), and (4) sentencing enhancements and reliance on dismissed charges.
- The First Circuit affirmed in all respects, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop, no reversible prejudice from the late disclosure or prosecutor questioning, and no error in applying the weapon and obstruction enhancements or in the sentencing reliance on conduct described in the PSR.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Mercer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawfulness of vehicle stop (reasonable suspicion) | Totality of circumstances (Magee's drug activity, intercepted call mentioning "Craig," observed interactions) gave officers reasonable suspicion to stop Mercer | Mere association with a suspected trafficker (Magee) and ambiguous conduct at Ruski's insufficient to support a stop | Affirmed: officers had individualized reasonable suspicion of a drug transaction and possession at time of stop |
| Rule 16 late disclosure / use of rebuttal text | Late disclosure did occur but District Court did not abuse discretion admitting text in rebuttal; no prejudice shown | Late production violated Rule 16 and prejudiced defense; prosecutor acted in bad faith | Affirmed: defendant failed to show specific prejudice or bad faith; no abuse of discretion |
| Prosecutor questioning about phone interactions (evidence not in record) | Questions were permissible and harmless in context of other evidence tying Mercer to Magee | Questioning introduced facts not in evidence, violating Sixth Amendment and jury-only evidence rule | Affirmed: plain-error review fails — no clear prejudice given other strong evidence of association |
| Sentencing enhancements & reliance on dismissed charges | Weapon (+2) and obstruction (+2) properly applied; District Court relied only on conduct in PSR (undisputed portions) when referencing dismissed charges | Weapon unrelated to drug offense (used for work); obstruction punished exercise of right to testify; court impermissibly relied on dismissed charges | Affirmed: padlock-bandana is a weapon and connection to offense not clearly improbable; perjury finding supported; references to dismissed charges did not constitute reliance on dismissed counts but on undisputed conduct in PSR |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (reasonable-suspicion totality-of-circumstances framework)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (reasonable suspicion standard for brief investigatory stops)
- Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (presence in a place with criminal activity insufficient alone to justify search/seizure)
- Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (mere association with addicts/traffickers not a permissible basis for intrusion)
- United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. review standards for suppression rulings)
- United States v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40 (permitting inference of criminal activity from contextual facts)
- United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111 (contextual evaluation of suspicious conduct)
- United States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7 (framework for weapon enhancement burden-shifting)
- United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724 (standard for demonstrating connection between weapon and crime clearly improbable)
- United States v. Preakos, 907 F.2d 7 (weapons commonly used to protect drug operations)
- United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (perjury at trial can support obstruction enhancement)
- United States v. Matiz, 14 F.3d 79 (sentencing findings that encompass elements of perjury are sufficient)
- United States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858 (assessing prejudice from late disclosure)