927 F.3d 39
1st Cir.2019Background
- On Aug. 24, 2017 Puerto Rico police stopped a car and discovered a .40 Glock with an extended 29‑round magazine, two loaded 13‑round magazines, and a chip converting the pistol to fully automatic. Passenger Rivera admitted ownership; Méndez (the driver) had no firearms permit and was on probation for prior felony convictions.
- A federal grand jury charged Méndez with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); he pleaded guilty.
- The PSR calculated a total offense level of 19 and criminal history category II, yielding a Guidelines range of 33–41 months; Méndez received a 3‑level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
- At sentencing the district court stated it had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, emphasized the danger of fully automatic weapons and Méndez’s commission of the offense while on probation, and imposed an above‑guidelines sentence of 60 months.
- Méndez did not object at sentencing but appealed, arguing procedural error for failure to consider relevant § 3553(a) factors and that the upward variance was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural error: failure to consider § 3553(a) factors | Méndez: court failed to consider his acceptance of responsibility and Rivera’s admission of ownership | Government: court expressly stated it considered § 3553(a) and PSR reflected acceptance credit; mitigating facts were in sentencing memorandum | No plain error; district court considered factors and granted acceptance reduction; procedural challenge fails |
| Substantive reasonableness of upward variance | Méndez: 60‑month sentence (19 months above Guidelines) is too harsh given mitigating circumstances (ownership dispute, background, remorse) | Government: variance justified by danger of modified automatic weapon and need for deterrence given offense while on probation | Abuse‑of‑discretion review: sentence rests on plausible rationale (dangerous weapon, deterrence); variance upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. González-Barbosa, 920 F.3d 125 (1st Cir. 2019) (plain‑error review standard for unpreserved sentencing objections)
- United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (district court must consider § 3553(a) factors)
- United States v. Reyes-Rivera, 812 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2016) (district court need not verbalize assessment of each § 3553(a) factor)
- United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2010) (statement that court considered § 3553(a) factors carries weight)
- United States v. Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant entitled to weighing of relevant factors, not a particular result)
- United States v. Rondón-García, 886 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2018) (standard for substantive‑reasonableness review)
- United States v. Pérez, 819 F.3d 541 (1st Cir. 2016) (sentence upheld if resting on plausible sentencing rationale)
- United States v. de Jesús, 831 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2016) (greater variance requires more compelling justification)
- United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171 (1st Cir. 2014) (principles on extent of variance and justification)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (deference to district court’s § 3553(a) determinations)