981 F.3d 1095
D.C. Cir.2020Background:
- In Jan 2013 Knight and Thorpe committed an armed robbery/kidnapping; D.C. prosecutors offered a wired plea: each plead to one count of assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW) and no further charges, with a Sentencing Guidelines range of ~2–6 years (statutory max 10 years).
- The plea was "wired": it required both defendants to accept or it would be withdrawn; it also barred seeking modification of pre-plea release.
- Knight’s Superior Court counsel misadvised him in open court that pleading ADW meant a 10‑year sentence and never explained the likely 2–6 year guideline range or the risk of federal indictment if they declined. Counsel said he would visit Knight but did not.
- Thorpe’s counsel timely advised Thorpe of the plea’s terms, the wired condition, and the risk of greater federal exposure; Thorpe wanted to accept. Knight rejected the plea; the prosecutors withdrew it, dismissed Superior Court charges, and obtained a 10‑count federal indictment.
- A jury convicted both; Knight was sentenced to 268 months and Thorpe to 300 months. On remand from this Court (claims deemed colorable), the district court found Knight’s counsel deficient but no prejudice; it found no deficiency for Thorpe. The panel reverses as to Knight, affirms as to Thorpe, and remands for a remedy consistent with the opinion.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was Knight’s Superior Court counsel constitutionally deficient in advising about the plea? | Knight: counsel misinformed him (said 10 years) and failed to explain sentencing exposure and worst‑case of rejecting plea. | Gov: largely conceded deficiency. | Held: counsel’s performance for Knight was constitutionally deficient. |
| 2. Did Knight suffer Strickland prejudice (would have accepted plea but for counsel)? | Knight: contemporaneous evidence (plea terms, his questions about "how much time," disparity in exposure, and Thorpe’s willingness) plus his hearing testimony show a reasonable probability he would have accepted. | Gov/district court: no contemporaneous evidence he would have accepted; his desire to attend his child’s birth and hope key witness wouldn’t testify indicate he would have rejected plea. | Held: district court’s no‑prejudice finding was clearly erroneous once counsel’s misinformation is accounted for; Knight showed prejudice (reasonable probability he would have accepted). |
| 3. Was Thorpe’s counsel ineffective for not coordinating with co‑counsel on a wired plea? | Thorpe: argued co‑defendant’s counsel failings prevented him from getting plea. | Gov: Thorpe’s counsel properly advised him, sought unwiring, and discussed risks; performance reasonable. | Held: Thorpe received effective assistance; no Sixth Amendment violation. |
| 4. Appropriate remedy for Knight’s Sixth Amendment violation? | Knight: remedy should restore benefit of original plea. | Gov/dissent: district court has discretion; reoffering may be inappropriate given intervening events and unfair to government. | Held: remedy is to require the government to reoffer the original plea to Knight; district court retains discretion under Lafler to accept/reject and to fashion relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (established two‑prong ineffective‑assistance test: deficiency + prejudice)
- Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (courts should look to contemporaneous evidence to corroborate post‑hoc claims about plea decisions)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (prejudice for rejected plea claims; remedy may include ordering prosecution to reoffer plea)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (counsel must communicate plea offers and prejudice standard for lost plea opportunities)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must advise about clear, easily ascertained consequences of plea decisions)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (district court may hold evidentiary hearings and take testimony in ineffective‑assistance claims)
- United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498 (D.C. Cir.) (wired plea and consequences for showing prejudice)
- United States v. Aguiar, 894 F.3d 351 (D.C. Cir.) (post‑conviction evidence may be admissible; Lee does not require defendant to anticipate counsel’s incompetence at time of plea)
- United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir.) (choices made under deficient advice may not reflect what a properly advised defendant would have done)
- United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir.) (district court lacks authority to reject plea agreement based solely on disagreement with prosecutor’s charging decisions)