United States v. Melot
712 F. App'x 719
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Billy and Katherine Melot owe over $20 million in federal taxes; Billy is serving a 14-year sentence for tax evasion.
- The government foreclosed on and sold the Melots’ property and equipment (2014) for $1.125 million, applying proceeds toward the tax debt; prior appeals challenged those sales and judgments.
- In 2016 the Melots moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6) to set aside the government’s money judgment as inequitable; they argued IRS billing errors and inability to pay made enforcement unjust.
- The magistrate judge recommended denying relief; the district court adopted that recommendation and denied the 60(b) motion.
- The Melots appealed, sought IFP status; the Tenth Circuit granted IFP but reviewed the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Melot's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(5) authorizes relief from the money judgment because enforcement is no longer equitable | The money judgment has prospective effect (it accrues interest), so 60(b)(5) relief applies | Money judgments are not "prospective" or executory; 60(b)(5) applies only to orders with prospective supervision | Denied — money judgments lack the requisite prospective application; 60(b)(5) unavailable |
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief based on alleged IRS billing errors and inability to pay | IRS’s internal records are inaccurate (sale proceeds not applied; higher assessed amount persists), and inability to ever pay is extraordinary | The government showed proceeds were applied and acknowledged it cannot collect more than the court-ordered judgment; inaccurate bills caused no present harm; inability to pay is not extraordinary | Denied — 60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances; none shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2016) (Rule 60(b) relief reserved for exceptional circumstances)
- Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2000) (abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denial of 60(b) relief)
- Dowell ex rel. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501 (10th Cir. 1993) (Rule 60(b)(5) limited to judgments with prospective application)
- Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining "executory" or supervisory relief as prospective)
- Swift & Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 106 (1932) (discussing nature of orders with future-directed supervision)
- Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. v. Pennsylvania, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856) (historic discussion of injunctive/prospective relief)
- Stokors S.A. v. Morrison, 147 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 1998) (money judgments generally lack prospective application under 60(b)(5))
- Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572 (10th Cir. 1996) (60(b)(6) applies only in extraordinary circumstances)
