United States v. McIlwain, 772 F.3d 688

Background

On Nov. 7, 2012, the Choctaw County (Ala.) Probate Court held a commitment hearing for Joseph Adam McIlwain and ordered him committed to the Alabama Department of Mental Health; he was transported to Bryce Hospital and treated before discharge to jail on Nov. 21, 2012.
The commitment petition alleged McIlwain had bipolar/mania/paranoia, posed a danger to himself and others, refused medication, had suicidal behavior in jail, and that commitment was the least restrictive option.
At the probate hearing McIlwain had appointed counsel/guardian ad litem (who waived preliminary hearing), testified, and the court heard sworn testimony from the sheriff, arresting chief, and a mental-health liaison (offered as an expert) before issuing written findings and a commitment order.
On Apr. 1, 2013 McIlwain was involved in a high-speed chase, fired three shots in a wooded area, surrendered a loaded firearm, and was arrested on state charges; he admitted possession and acknowledged the November 2012 commitment.
A federal grand jury indicted McIlwain on Apr. 25, 2013 for possession of a firearm by a person “who has been committed to a mental institution” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); McIlwain moved to dismiss, arguing his Alabama proceeding was only an emergency hospitalization and constitutionally deficient.
The district court denied the motion; McIlwain entered a conditional guilty plea reserving appeal; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the prior probate commitment satisfied § 922(g)(4) and collateral attack was unavailable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Nov. 2012 Alabama probate order qualifies as a § 922(g)(4) “committ[ment] to a mental institution.”	McIlwain: the proceeding was an emergency/temporary hospitalization, not a final statutory commitment, so § 922(g)(4) does not apply.	Government: the probate court conducted a formal adversary hearing, made statutory findings, issued a commitment order, and thus it was a formal commitment.	Held: the probate proceeding was a formal involuntary commitment under Ala. Code § 22‑52, and therefore satisfies § 922(g)(4).
Whether the probate process complied with Alabama statutory/due‑process requirements.	McIlwain: process was deficient — hearing occurred in one day, no testimony from a qualified medical professional, and counsel waived preliminaries under pressure.	Government: counsel/guardian ad litem validly waived preliminary hearing; McIlwain received appointed counsel, a formal hearing, cross‑examined witnesses, and written findings tracking the statute.	Held: procedural and substantive requirements under Alabama law were met; findings were supported by sworn testimony.
Whether a federal § 922(g)(4) prosecution permits a collateral attack on the validity of a prior state commitment.	McIlwain: due‑process defects in the state commitment require excluding it from § 922(g)(4) predicate.	Government: collateral attack on state adjudication is not permitted; follow Lewis and related Eleventh Circuit precedent barring collateral challenges to predicate state orders.	Held: collateral attack is not allowed; validity of state commitment is irrelevant to federal § 922(g)(4) prosecution.
How to interpret “committed to a mental institution” in § 922(g)(4).	McIlwain: (implicit) statute should not reach temporary/emergency observation placements.	Government: phrase covers a formal, involuntary commitment by a court or other lawful authority, not voluntary admissions or short observation holds.	Held: interpret phrase by ordinary meaning and ATF regulation — requires a formal, involuntary commitment by a court/authority; the probate order met that standard.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988) (temporary/detainment under emergency certificate not a § 922(g)(4) commitment without formal court action)
United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1973) (temporary hospitalization under board order did not qualify as statutory commitment)
United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012) (Maine’s short emergency admission procedure does not satisfy § 922(g)(4); commitment requires adversary hearing and judicial findings)
United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999) (judicial proceeding with counsel, expert exam, findings, order, and confinement falls within § 922(g)(4))
United States v. Dorsch, 363 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2004) (state board hearing with counsel, evidence, and physician testimony constituted commitment for § 922(g)(4))
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (predicate state adjudications may not be collaterally attacked in federal prosecutions under § 922(g))