583 F.Supp.3d 1
D.D.C.2022Background
- On Jan. 6, 2021 Congress convened to certify the Electoral College vote; a violent mob breached the Capitol, injuring officers and delaying the certification.
- Sean McHugh traveled from California, attended the rally, marched to the Capitol, used a megaphone to urge rioters, scuffled with officers, helped push a metal sign into a barricade, and allegedly sprayed officers with bear spray.
- McHugh was arrested, detained, and charged in a superseding indictment with ten counts: misdemeanors under 40 U.S.C. § 5104 and felonies including assault on officers (18 U.S.C. § 111), obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)), civil disorder (18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3)), and trespass/violence in restricted grounds (18 U.S.C. § 1752).
- McHugh moved to dismiss five counts: Count Five (§ 1512(c)(2)) arguing the Electoral College certification was not an “official proceeding” and the statute is vague; Count Two (§ 231(a)(3)) arguing vagueness and overbreadth; Counts Six–Eight (§ 1752) arguing restricted area must be established by Secret Service and that the Vice President was not “temporarily visiting.”
- The district court rejected McHugh’s challenges and denied the motion to dismiss in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Congress’s Jan. 6 certification is an “official proceeding” under § 1515/§ 1512(c)(2) | Gov’t: The certification is a formal congressional assembly involving the Electoral College and therefore a proceeding before Congress. | McHugh: "Proceeding before the Congress" requires adjudicative/quasi‑adjudicative character; certification is merely ceremonial/ministerial. | Court: Certification is a formal assembly involving another entity (Electoral College); it is an "official proceeding." |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague (esp. “corruptly”) | Gov’t: Courts have longitudinally defined “corruptly” to require consciousness of wrongdoing and a nexus to the proceeding, supplying fair notice. | McHugh: “Corruptly” and “official proceeding” are vague; Poindexter shows vagueness risk. | Court: §1512(c)(2) is not unconstitutionally vague; Poindexter is cabined; judicial gloss and mens rea/nexus requirements cure vagueness. |
| Whether § 231(a)(3) (civil disorder) is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad | Gov’t: §231 targets conduct, includes a scienter (intent to obstruct/impede/interfere), and has a statutory definition of “civil disorder,” so it gives fair notice and does not substantially proscribe protected speech. | McHugh: Terms (civil disorder, incident to, obstruct/impede) are vague; statute lacks clear mens rea and reaches protected expressive conduct. | Court: §231(a)(3) requires specific intent, is not vague, and is not facially overbroad because it targets conduct (not speech) and has limiting definitions. |
| Whether § 1752’s “restricted building or grounds” requires restriction by Secret Service and whether VP was “temporarily visiting” the Capitol | Gov’t: §1752 covers any posted/cordoned/otherwise restricted area; no textual requirement that only Secret Service may restrict; VP was temporarily visiting the Capitol on Jan. 6. | McHugh: Only Secret Service can create restricted areas; Pence was not a temporary visitor because the Capitol is his regular official place. | Court: The statute does not limit who may restrict an area; Secret Service need not have imposed the restriction. Pence’s presence on Jan. 6 was a temporary visit; the Capitol qualified as restricted grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (interprets “knowingly corruptly persuade” and requires consciousness of wrongdoing to limit §1512(b) mens rea)
- Poindexter v. United States, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reversed convictions under §1505 for vagueness in that statute’s application; court limits Poindexter’s reach)
- Aguilar v. United States, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (requires a nexus between defendant’s conduct and the official proceeding for obstruction statutes)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (sets stringent vagueness standard: fair notice and prohibition on laws inviting arbitrary enforcement)
- Bronstein v. United States, 849 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (vagueness principles and interpretation guidance)
- Ermoian v. United States, 752 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) (interprets “proceeding before” a federal agency to require a proceeding involving another entity, not an internal investigation)
- Ramos v. United States, 537 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (agency proceeding interpretation: “before” implies parties appear before the body)
- Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (judicial gloss can supply the clarity necessary to uphold statutory language against vagueness challenges)
- Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (fair‑notice principle: criminal statutes must give clear warning when required mens rea is involved)
- Foran (Nat’l Mobilization Comm. v. Foran), 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969) (construed §231 to require specific intent to obstruct/impede law enforcement)