United States v. McGregor
832 F. Supp. 2d 1332
M.D. Ala.2011Background
- Post-mistrial, defendants move to dismiss the indictment and seek acquittals on double-jeopardy grounds.
- Defendants rely on collateral estoppel to bar retrial on hung counts by arguing acquittals determined essential facts.
- Court explains retrial after a hung jury is permissible; collateral estoppel in criminal trials is a narrow exception.
- First trial (Aug. 2011) produced 91 not-guilty verdicts and 33 unresolved counts; government to retry remaining counts.
- Jury found most honest-services counts not guilty and extortion counts not guilty; some honest-services and extortion counts remained contested.
- Court applies a two-step collateral-estoppel inquiry and rejects defendants’ contention that acquittals necessarily foreclose retrial on hung counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does collateral estoppel bar retrial on hung counts? | McGregor/others contend acquittals/lack of guilt decide facts. | Defendants argue acquittals on honest-services counts preclude hung-count retrial. | No; collateral estoppel does not bar retrial on hung counts. |
| Did jury necessarily decide any fact in favor of defendants on honest-services/mail- and wire-fraud counts? | Acquittals signal lack of proof on scheme elements. | Acquittals reflect broader defense that the scheme was not proven, not necessarily every element. | No; no necessarily decided fact identified to bar retrial. |
| Do extortion acquittals preclude retrial on bribery/conspiracy charges? | Extortion acquittals demonstrate absence of quid pro quo benefiting bribery scheme. | Acquittals could stem from multiple factual predicates; do not foreclose other charges. | No; extortion acquittals do not bar retrial on bribery/conspiracy. |
| What standard governs collateral estoppel in this criminal context? | Use the two-step inquiry to identify necessarily decided issues. | Findings must be narrowly construed; jury’s not-guilty may not reflect specific factual determinations. | Two-step inquiry applied; no necessarily decided issues found. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1970) (collateral estoppel in criminal trials; once decided, issue cannot be litigated)
- Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (U.S. 2009) (if issue was not necessarily decided, cannot be relitigated)
- Ohayon v. United States, 483 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (two-step collateral estoppel inquiry in criminal cases)
- United States v. Bennett, 836 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding of fact must be inconsistent with guilt in second trial)
- United States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201 (11th Cir. 1993) (collateral estoppel is a narrow exception; high burden on defense)
- United States v. Coughlin, 610 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (where multiple counts, jury may have found lacks of intent; upholds limited preclusion)
- United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (procedure for frivolous vs nonfrivolous double-jeopardy claims; written findings)