United States v. McDaniels
147 F. Supp. 3d 427
E.D. Va.2015Background
- Defendant indicted on five counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two Hobbs Act robberies (18 U.S.C. § 1951), and two § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) counts for using/brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.
- Two alleged robberies: (1) McDonald’s armed robbery with two gunmen who threatened employees and patrons and obtained ~$2,221; (2) RadioShack armed robbery where defendant brandished a handgun and obtained $398.
- Defendant moved pretrial to dismiss the two § 924(c) counts, arguing Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3).
- § 924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” via (A) the Force Clause (use/attempted/threatened physical force) and (B) the Residual Clause (substantial risk that physical force may be used).
- Court denied the motion: held the categorical approach does not govern pretrial dismissal motions on § 924(c) elements and, alternatively, concluded Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the Force Clause; also declined to reach (but discussed) vagueness arguments about the Residual Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the categorical approach applies on a pretrial motion to dismiss a § 924(c) count | Prosecution: element “crime of violence” must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; jury should decide facts | McDaniels: the court should apply the categorical approach and dismiss if the statute is not categorically a crime of violence | Categorical approach does not apply pretrial; the question whether a particular predicate offense is a § 924(c) crime of violence is for the jury when contested pretrial |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under the Force Clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)) | Government: Hobbs Act robbery tracks common-law robbery (violence or intimidation) and thus meets the Force Clause | McDaniels: Hobbs Act’s “fear of injury” language could encompass non-physical threats (e.g., poisoning), so it lacks an element of physical force | Held: Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under the Force Clause; Castleman rejects the argument that indirect means (e.g., poison) fall outside “use of force” |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under the Residual Clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)) | Government: alternatively, Hobbs Act robbery involves a substantial risk that force may be used and therefore qualifies | McDaniels: Residual Clause is void for vagueness post-Johnson and cannot be used to qualify Hobbs Act robbery | Court: unnecessary to decide because Force Clause suffices; but observed § 924(c)(3)(B) is distinguishable from the ACCA residual clause struck in Johnson and likely survives |
| Whether Johnson’s vagueness holding automatically invalidates the § 924(c) Residual Clause | N/A | McDaniels: urges applying Johnson to § 924(c)(3)(B) | Court: Johnson is distinguishable on several grounds; did not strike § 924(c)(3)(B) here because Force Clause is dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes the categorical approach for predicate-crime determinations in the ACCA sentencing context)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (clarifies limits of categorical approach and modified categorical analysis)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (elements that increase mandatory minimums must be submitted to a jury)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (struck ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (held that using a poison can constitute the “use” of force for purposes of a domestic-violence statute, rejecting a narrow reading that would exclude indirect means)