United States v. McCranie, 889 F.3d 677

Edward McCranie pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (force, violence, or intimidation).
The presentence report treated this conviction and two prior robberies (federal and Colorado aggravated robbery) as crimes of violence, making McCranie a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and raising his Guidelines range to 151–188 months.
McCranie objected at sentencing, arguing none of the prior convictions qualified as crimes of violence; the district court rejected the objection and imposed a 175‑month sentence.
On appeal the sole contested legal question was whether federal bank robbery by intimidation categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo, applied the categorical approach, and held that bank robbery by intimidation requires the threatened use of physical force and therefore categorically qualifies as a crime of violence; the panel affirmed.

Issue	McCranie’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether federal bank robbery can be committed without the use/ threatened use of physical force (e.g., via non‑physical means like poisoned mail)	Bank robbery can be committed by non‑physical means (e.g., threats to unleash anthrax), so some convictions need not involve "physical force."	Supreme Court and subsequent Tenth Circuit precedent reject a non‑physical‑force exception; non‑physical means that cause bodily injury are encompassed.	Rejected McCranie’s non‑physical‑force argument; such means fall within the scope of physical‑force jurisprudence.
Whether "intimidation" under § 2113(a) can be satisfied by subjective timidity of the victim rather than an objectively threatened use of physical force	Intimidation could be established by a timid victim’s subjective fear, so the statute criminalizes conduct that might not threaten physical force.	Tenth Circuit precedent and the pattern jury instruction require objectively reasonable fear of bodily harm caused by defendant conduct—i.e., a threatened use of physical force.	Held that "intimidation" requires conduct reasonably calculated to instill fear of bodily harm; bank robbery by intimidation categorically involves threatened physical force.

United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2017) (Colorado aggravated robbery qualifies as a crime of violence)
United States v. Ontiveros, 875 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 2017) (rejecting non‑physical‑force argument post‑Castleman)
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (Supreme Court rejecting notion that bodily injury can occur without physical force)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (describing categorical approach focus on statutory elements)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach requires realistic probability, not mere possibility)
United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2018) (bank robbery by intimidation requires threatened physical force)
United States v. Ellison, 866 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2017) (same)
United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2016) (interpreting ACCA elements clause similarly to require threatened physical force)