United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72

Maurer pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
District Court sentenced Maurer to 60 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release with internet and minor-contact restrictions.
PSR calculated offense level 28, history category I; base range 78–97 months; court denied § 2G2.2(b)(4) enhancement objections but applied it in the final calculation.
Court noted Maurer admitted possession of over 600 images; evidence included images of prepubescent victims and violent sexual acts.
Two challenged special conditions: (i) internet access ban with court to resolve disputes; (ii) prohibition on contact with minors, subject to Probation approval.
Maurer did not object to the supervised release terms; he appealed only on procedural reasonableness and the two special conditions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2G2.2(b)(4) applies to Maurer	Maurer argues the enhancement is vague and requires intent or pleasure.	Maurer contends the provision is vague and the district court erred in applying it.	§ 2G2.2(b)(4) applied; ordinary meaning supports applicability.
Interpretation of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and evidence needed	The government need not show defendant’s intent or pleasure; strict liability applies.	No specific proof of intent or derived pleasure is required by the district court's finding.	Court held strict liability and no requirement to prove intent or pleasure.
Impact of plea agreement on sentencing findings	Plea stipulations bind the court’s factual basis.	Judge may make independent factual findings beyond stipulations.	District Court could make independent factual findings beyond stipulations.
Special condition restricting internet access	Restriction is tailored, time-limited, and tied to predatory risk.	Condition is overly broad given lack of actual minor contact.	Condition upheld as reasonable under 3553(a) and tailored to risk; five-year duration affirmed.
Special condition restricting contact with minors	Condition necessary to deter and protect public; no improper delegation.	May constitute excessive delegation and is overbroad.	Condition upheld; not an improper delegation under quoted precedents; five-year term considered.

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (plain meaning governs terms absent definition)
Flemming v. United States, 617 F.3d 252 (2010) (guidelines interpreted by plain meaning; dictionary aid)
Rearden, 349 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (application of § 2G2.2(b)(4) to prepubescent sexual activity)
Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2000) (interpretation of 'sadistic' and 'violence' in § 2G2.2(b)(4))
Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1996) (application of the enhancement to sexual abuse imagery)
Freeman, 578 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (depictions involving minor pain support § 2G2.2(b)(4))
Caro, 309 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (no expert testimony required to determine sadism)
Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2009) (internet restrictions and predation concerns in sentencing)
Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007) (limitations on broad, lifetime internet bans and delegation concerns)
Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (probation conditions and their relation to 3553(a))
Warren, 186 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 1999) (requirement to explain conditions or show viable basis for restriction)
United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (three-factor framework for internet restriction challenges)
United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (fact-specific approach to internet restrictions)