United States v. Matthew Hataway
933 F.3d 940
| 8th Cir. | 2019

Background

  • Defendant Matthew Hataway pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and USSG §2K2.1 enhancements, producing a 262‑month sentence plus 5 years supervised release.
  • The ACCA and Guidelines’ force clauses cover offenses that have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another.
  • The district court treated two prior convictions as qualifying: an Arkansas aggravated assault conviction under Ark. Code Ann. §5-13-204(a) (pointing a firearm/threatening) and a South Carolina pointing-a-firearm conviction under S.C. Code Ann. §16-23-410.
  • Hataway contested (1) that the Arkansas §5-13-204(a)(2) conviction qualifies under the ACCA/Guidelines force clauses, and (2) that the South Carolina §16-23-410 conviction qualifies; he also challenged a supervised‑release condition requiring alcohol abstinence during treatment.
  • The court applied the categorical/modified categorical approach: where a state statute is divisible, a court may consult a limited set of judicial documents to determine which statutory alternative the defendant was convicted under.
  • The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held the Arkansas (a)(2) subsection and the South Carolina pointing statute qualify as violent felonies/crimes of violence; the supervised‑release alcohol‑abstinence condition was reasonable given the defendant’s drug‑dependence history.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Arkansas aggravated assault §5-13-204(a)(2) is an ACCA violent felony / Guidelines crime of violence Hataway: (a)(2) only requires ‘‘display’’ creating substantial danger, which need not be threatened/physical force Government: Information charged pointing and threatening, which tracks (a)(2) and involves threatened use of force Held: Qualifies; Information narrowed charge to (a)(2) (pointing/threatening), which meets the force clause
Whether judicial records sufficiently show conviction under (a)(2) for modified categorical approach Hataway: Charging document quoted entire statute, so cannot be sure he pleaded to (a)(2) Government: Information alleges pointing/threatening; that factual allegation narrows to (a)(2) Held: No plain error; the Information’s specific allegation establishes conviction under (a)(2)
Whether S.C. §16‑23‑410 (presenting/pointing a firearm) is a crime of violence under the force clause Hataway: Reyes‑Soto and King misread South Carolina precedent; statute could encompass non‑threatening or negligent conduct Government: Eighth Circuit precedent (Reyes‑Soto) and Fourth Circuit (King) treat it as categorical crime of violence Held: Foreclosed by Reyes‑Soto; §16‑23‑410 is a crime of violence
Whether court abused discretion imposing alcohol‑abstinence special condition of supervised release Hataway: No finding of alcoholism or nexus to offense/rehabilitation Government: Defendant has long history of substance abuse; condition aims to curb addictive behavior during treatment Held: Condition reasonable; no abuse of discretion given defendant’s drug‑dependence history

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (categorical/modified categorical approach and realistic‑probability standard)
  • Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisible statutes and modified categorical approach)
  • United States v. Jordan, 812 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 2016) (Ark. §5-13-204 divisible; (a)(1) not ACCA violent felony)
  • United States v. Horse Looking, 828 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2016) (charging document and plea colloquy must show conviction necessarily under qualifying subsection)
  • United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (indictment that makes clear force element permits modified categorical finding)
  • United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476 (8th Cir. 2011) (charging allegations that track qualifying subsection suffice)
  • United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009) (displaying/pointing a weapon can constitute threatened use of physical force)
  • United States v. Maid, 772 F.3d 1118 (8th Cir. 2014) (pointing or threatening with a firearm is categorically a crime of violence under Guidelines)
  • Reyes‑Soto v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 2015) (S.C. §16-23-410 is a crime of violence under the force clause)
  • United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2012) (construing S.C. §16-23-410 as categorically a crime of violence)
  • United States v. Forde, 664 F.3d 1219 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding alcohol‑abstinence condition where defendant was drug dependent)
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