United States v. Master Giddins
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10019
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- In Sept 2013 three bank robberies occurred; surveillance, witness statements, and GPS/phone evidence linked a silver Ford Focus to the crimes. Co-defendants Fitz and Chandler were arrested and implicated Master Giddins; police obtained an arrest warrant for Giddins.
- On Oct 4, 2013 Giddins went to Baltimore County PD to retrieve his car, was taken to an interview room, and interviewed by Detectives Morano and Taylor (and an observer). The encounter was videotaped.
- Detectives presented a Miranda waiver, told Giddins they needed to ask questions before returning his car, moved his phone at times, and at one point (after showing surveillance photos) confronted him; Giddins signed the waiver and answered questions but invoked his right to counsel about 22 minutes after signing.
- Giddins was later indicted federally for three counts of bank robbery and one count of conspiracy. He moved to suppress the videotaped statement; the district court denied suppression and the video was played at trial. The jury convicted on one robbery count and conspiracy.
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit majority held (1) the pre-waiver encounter was custodial under the totality of the circumstances, (2) the Miranda waiver and subsequent statements were involuntary because police economically coerced and affirmatively misled Giddins, and (3) admission of the statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt — thus reversing the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Giddins' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the interview before formal arrest was "custodial" for Miranda | The encounter was custodial: locked door behind him, multiple officers, phone control, and leverage over return of his car meant a reasonable person would not feel free to leave | Not custodial: Giddins came voluntarily to get his car, not handcuffed, one exit unlocked, nonthreatening tone, and officers’ subjective knowledge irrelevant | Custodial: under totality a reasonable person would feel unable to terminate the interview to avoid losing car; Miranda applied |
| Whether Giddins’ Miranda waiver was voluntary | Waiver coerced: economic leverage (threat of withholding car) plus officers’ deceptive assurances he was not "in trouble" overbore his will | Waiver voluntary: police statements were truthful or not materially misleading; delay in return of car is not comparable to Garrity/Lefkowitz coercion; Detective tone and setting noncoercive | Involuntary: coercion (economic pressure and affirmative deception about being a suspect) overbore Giddins’ will; waiver invalid |
| Whether pre-waiver or other pre-Miranda statements were involuntary | (Primarily focused on waiver) argued some pre-waiver statements were coerced but not pressed on appeal | Government treated pre-waiver as routine booking/biographical questions; waived issues | Court limited decision to Miranda waiver and post-waiver statements; pre-waiver booking questions not dispositive |
| Whether admission of the videotaped statements was harmless error | Admission was prejudicial: government highlighted Giddins’ statements in opening/closing and used them to attack his alibi and corroborate CSLI/phone-location evidence | Evidence against Giddins was otherwise strong (surveillance, co-defendant statements, CSLI, eyewitnesses) so any error was harmless | Not harmless: under Chapman/Fulminante/Thompson test there is a reasonable possibility the tainted statements contributed to conviction; reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police must advise of Fifth Amendment rights before custodial interrogation)
- Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (public employees coerced to choose between job forfeiture and self-incrimination cannot have statements used in criminal prosecution)
- Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (state cannot impose penalties that coerce assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (harmless-error framework for involuntary confessions)
- Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (custody is mixed question; objective test whether reasonable person would feel free to leave)
- United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997) (government bears burden to prove voluntariness; coercion required to find involuntary confession)
- United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2013) (totality-of-the-circumstances custody factors)
- United States v. Holmes, 670 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2012) (totality-of-the-circumstances test for voluntariness and custodial analysis)