United States v. Martinez-Mercado
3:15-cr-00576
D.P.R.Aug 8, 2017Background
- Defendant Francisco Martinez-Mercado, an ATF task force officer, was convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to deprive a person of Fourth Amendment rights via a September 23, 2010 burglary. He was sentenced to 87 months.
- Government proof included co‑conspirator testimony from two former PRPD officers (Lopez‑Torres and Ramos‑Figueroa), phone/tower records placing Martinez and Lopez‑Torres in the same area the night of the burglary, physical evidence from the crime scene, and a disposable phone recovered from Martinez linking him to Lopez‑Torres.
- At trial the defense attacked the credibility of Lopez‑Torres and Ramos‑Figueroa, eliciting their plea agreements, cooperation benefits, and histories of dishonesty; the court instructed the jury to view their testimony with caution.
- After conviction, the government disclosed FBI 302 memoranda summarizing interviews with other inmates (Lopez‑Ortiz, Vazquez‑Ruiz, and an interview of Arroyo‑Rosa) who said they overheard Lopez‑Torres and Ramos‑Figueroa discuss fabricating testimony.
- Martinez moved for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, arguing the inmate statements were newly discovered evidence that would likely lead to acquittal; the court agreed the first two Wright factors (unknown and due diligence) were met but denied the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Martinez's Argument | Government's / Court's Response | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post‑verdict inmate statements (FBI 302s) constitute newly discovered evidence warranting a Rule 33 new trial under Wright test | The 302s show co‑witnesses conspired to concoct testimony, so the evidence is material and would probably result in acquittal | The 302s are cumulative/impeaching, largely hearsay, and would not materially change the verdict given trial evidence | Denied — fails Wright prongs 3 and 4 (materiality and likelihood of acquittal) |
| Admissibility / materiality of the 302 hearsay statements | The statements prove perjury and undermine co‑witness accounts | The statements repeat impeachment themes already fully developed at trial; they do not directly exculpate Martinez or provide admissible substantive proof | Denied — statements are merely cumulative impeachment, not material new evidence |
| Whether the new evidence would probably result in acquittal on retrial | 302s would convince a jury that co‑witnesses perjured themselves, undermining key testimony | Phone records, circumstantial evidence, and prior trial impeachment mean retrial would likely produce the same result; 302s would not probably lead to acquittal | Denied — no showing of actual probability of acquittal |
| Whether an evidentiary hearing on the 302s is warranted | Martinez requested a hearing to develop the inmate testimony | Court evaluated practicality and found the 302s cumulative and insufficient to alter the verdict; an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary | Denied — no hearing because evidence is cumulative and would not affect the verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1980) (articulates four‑prong test for newly discovered evidence Rule 33 motions)
- United States v. Hernandez‑Rodriguez, 443 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2006) (new evidence may warrant new trial when it speaks directly to defendant's innocence)
- United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2007) (trial court's discretion in weighing cumulative jailhouse recantations; practical evaluation for evidentiary hearings)
- United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2000) (evaluation of new evidence must be in juxtaposition to trial record; impeachment evidence ordinarily insufficient)
- United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 1999) (perjury discovery treated as newly discovered evidence but must be sufficiently compelling to probably produce acquittal)
- United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1216 (1st Cir. 1993) (new evidence must create an actual probability of acquittal)
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Gonzalez, 258 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (distinguishes standards depending on whether government knowingly used perjured testimony; affirms denial when new evidence is cumulative)
- United States v. Vigneau, 337 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2003) (difficulty of satisfying fourth Wright prong; newly discovered evidence must overcome abundance of trial proof)