United States v. Martinez, 19-1389

Damon Martinez pleaded guilty to felon-in-possession after state parole stop uncovered drugs and a firearm; the PSR recommended the District of Colorado’s post-Cabral Standard Condition 12.
Post-Cabral Standard Condition 12 allows a probation officer, after obtaining court approval, either to notify third parties of risks posed by a defendant or to direct the defendant to do so.
Martinez objected to the PSR, arguing that any post-sentencing risk-notification that effectively modifies supervised-release conditions would trigger the Rule 32.1(c) right to a counseled hearing before modification.
The district court overruled Martinez’s objection; Martinez appealed on the Rule 32.1(c) ripeness/modification theory and also challenged the classification of two prior felonies as crimes of violence.
The panel dismissed the Rule 32.1(c) challenge as prudentially unripe because resolution depends on contingent factual developments about whether and how probation and the court will act.
The court affirmed the crimes-of-violence determinations, noting binding circuit precedent upholding Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. §4B1.2.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether post‑sentencing third‑party risk notifications under the District of Colorado’s Standard Condition 12 constitute a modification of supervised‑release conditions requiring a Rule 32.1(c) hearing	Martinez: any post‑sentencing order requiring notification (or approving officer notification) is a modification subject to Rule 32.1(c) and the right to counsel/hearing	Government: probation‑officer or court notifications are contingent actions; probation officer notification need not be a supervised‑release "condition" and the issue is premature	Dismissed as prudentially unripe; requires factual development (whether notification will occur, who will notify, and whether court will approve without a Rule 32.1(c) hearing)
Whether attempted robbery and conspiracy to commit menacing with a deadly weapon qualify as "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 and its Application Note 1	Martinez: Application Note 1 improperly expands §4B1.2 by treating attempts and conspiracies as crimes of violence	Government: Application Note 1 is a permissible interpretation under binding precedent	Rejected; panel affirmed. Circuit precedent (United States v. Martinez) controls and forecloses the challenge

Roe No. 2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) (standard of de novo review for ripeness)
United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687 (10th Cir. 2019) (analyzing District of Colorado Standard Condition 12; distinguished ripe improper‑delegation claim from unripe vagueness/challenge contingent on future enforcement)
United States v. Ford, 882 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2018) (ripeness: challenges contingent on decisions by another actor are unripe)
United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316 (10th Cir. 2016) (ripeness and hardship inquiry where future actor decisions determine application of supervised‑release condition)
United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding Application Note 1 to §4B1.2 as permissible interpretation)