United States v. Martinez
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21452
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- Defendants Karapet Dzhanikyan and Ronald Martinez were tried together on a superseding indictment arising from a wiretap investigation of alleged drug trafficker Safwan Madarati; by trial only Dzhanikyan and Martinez remained.
- Counts: Dzhanikyan – conspiracy to distribute oxycodone (21 U.S.C. § 846). Martinez – two extortion-conspiracy counts (18 U.S.C. § 894(a)) and two counts of possession-with-intent-to-distribute crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
- Pretrial severance: Martinez moved to sever (denied); Dzhanikyan made no pretrial severance motion. Trial proceeded jointly; Martinez obtained acquittal on Count 2 (jewelry‑store extortion) via Rule 29(a) but was convicted on Count 3 (extortion attempt re: Victor Loukas) and the drug counts.
- During jury deliberations the jury asked whether it could “use all the evidence presented during the trial as we evaluate each individual charge?” The court answered “Yes” (single‑word answer). Counsel objected to lack of a limiting instruction but did not propose wording.
- Defendants moved for acquittal and renewed for a new trial alleging spillover, variance, and retroactive misjoinder based on the court’s answer; district court denied. On appeal the First Circuit affirmed all convictions except Martinez’s Count 3 extortion-conspiracy conviction, which it reversed for insufficient evidence that an “extension of credit” existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying pretrial severance (Dzhanikyan) | Joint trial proper; evidence against Martinez not likely to confuse jury about Dzhanikyan’s distinct drug conspiracy | Joint trial created serious risk of prejudice from inflammatory extortion evidence | Denial affirmed; plain‑error review fails—no evident prejudice |
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying pretrial severance (Martinez) | Evidence of co‑defendant’s drug conduct relevant; trial need not be severed | Co‑defendant’s drug‑distribution evidence prejudiced Martinez’s intent inference for his crack possession counts | Denial affirmed; incremental prejudice insufficient to show abuse |
| Whether the court’s one‑word answer (“Yes”) to jury’s evidence question caused impermissible spillover/retroactive misjoinder | Jury could consider all evidence only as applicable to each charge; jury instructions as a whole limited use | Single‑word answer caused evidentiary spillover and variance, warranting new trial | Denial of new trial affirmed; considering entire charge, instructions required separate consideration of each count |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Madarati made an “extension of credit” (Martinez, Count 3) | Evidence of post‑return communications and delay in using extortionate means supports tacit agreement to defer payment | No evidence Madarati assented (expressly or tacitly) to defer payment; demands for immediate payment contradict extension | Reversed as to Count 3; record lacks sufficient indicia that Madarati agreed to defer repayment, so no “extension of credit” proved |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.) (trial court has broad discretion on severance; reversal only for abuse producing evident prejudice)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (joint‑trial severance standard: separate trials warranted only to avoid serious risk of prejudice)
- United States v. Hoyle, 237 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (sufficiency for § 894: look for "sufficient indicia" of an agreement to defer payment)
- United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir.) (creditor’s demand can imply prior deferral; informs § 894 analysis)
- United States v. Wallace, 59 F.3d 333 (2d Cir.) (government must show creditor’s manifestation of assent to defer; delay alone insufficient)
- United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.) (extension of credit is deliberate act by creditor; proof of assent required)