United States v. Martez Dickson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3558
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- In May 2014 police found Martez Dickson asleep in a running rental car in a McDonald’s drive‑thru; a bottle of vodka was in the center console and the rental agreement listed another person as renter.
- Officer Curran removed the keys from the ignition for safety, tried to wake Dickson, and shook him when yelling failed; another officer then saw a handgun lodged between the driver’s seat and center console and recovered it.
- Dickson was arrested, the vehicle was impounded, and an inventory search later produced small amounts of heroin and marijuana (drug evidence not used at trial).
- Dickson was tried and convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of a firearm, classified as an armed career criminal, and sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment.
- Dickson moved to suppress the gun and drugs arguing unlawful seizure/search; the district court denied suppression and imposed supervised‑release conditions including (1) remaining within the defendant’s “jurisdiction” unless permitted to leave and (2) notifying third parties of unspecified “risks.”
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the evidentiary ruling but found the two supervised‑release conditions unconstitutionally vague and remanded for limited resentencing to amend those conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers unlawfully seized Dickson when Curran entered car and shook him awake after removing keys | Curran’s actions were an unlawful seizure because safety concerns were abated once keys were removed; thus evidence obtained thereafter should be suppressed | Officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate for drunk driving, actions were reasonable for safety and investigation; gun discovered in plain view; inevitable discovery would apply | Denial of suppression affirmed: court found officer conduct reasonable and, alternatively, inevitable discovery would justify admission |
| Whether Dickson had standing/expectation of privacy to challenge search of rental car | Dickson argued he could challenge the car search | Government argued unlicensed, unauthorized driver lacked expectation of privacy in rental car | Court declined to resolve rental‑car privacy question; held Dickson could challenge any search resulting from unlawful seizure of his person |
| Whether condition requiring defendant to remain within his “jurisdiction” is vague | “Jurisdiction” is unconstitutionally vague and could confuse supervision limits | Government said a standing order clarified the term and remand unnecessary | Condition vacated as vague; remand for limited resentencing to amend condition |
| Whether third‑party notification condition (notify third parties of unspecified “risks”) is vague | Condition improperly vague because it forces defendant to determine when notifications are required | Government again relied on standing order to clarify; opposed full resentencing | Condition vacated as vague; remand for limited amendment of supervision terms |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitaker v. United States, 820 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- Sanford v. United States, 806 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2015) (standing to challenge searches and relation to unlawful seizure)
- Haywood v. United States, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003) (rental‑car driver privacy discussion)
- Cartwright v. United States, 630 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010) (inevitable discovery doctrine)
- Maher v. United States, 454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006) (waking a sleeping person is not necessarily a Fourth Amendment seizure)
- Smith v. Ball State Univ., 295 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2002) (officer may order a driver out of a vehicle to investigate drunk driving)
- Ortiz v. United States, 817 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2016) (condition to remain within jurisdiction held vague)
- Bickart v. United States, 825 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2016) (third‑party notification condition held vague)