United States v. Marte-De La Cruz, 876 F.3d 370

Marte-de la Cruz, a Dominican national, was intercepted in 2016 attempting to enter the U.S.; he had been removed in 2014 following a 2010 conviction in Puerto Rico and was charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) for attempted illegal reentry after removal following an aggravated-felony conviction.
He waived indictment, entered a plea agreement admitting the government's factual statement (which characterized the 2010 conviction as robbery/aggravated robbery), and agreed to a recommended total offense level of 19 (base 8 +16 for prior crime of violence/aggravated felony, -3 acceptance, -2 fast-track).
At the change-of-plea hearing he affirmed the plea, that the agreement was translated and explained in Spanish, and expressly waived his right to appeal if sentenced in accordance with the agreement.
The PSR and court proceedings at times used the term "robbery" and cited Article 199 of the Puerto Rico Penal Code (aggravated robbery), though portions of the PSR also referenced "2nd degree burglary."
The district court sentenced him to 33 months (the agreed Level 19, low end) and reiterated that his plea contained an appeal waiver; four days later Marte-de la Cruz filed an appeal arguing his prior conviction was actually second-degree burglary, not an aggravated felony or crime of violence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the appeal waiver is enforceable	Waiver invalid or should not bar review because counsel rushed plea and factual error (prior conviction not aggravated felony)	Waiver was knowing, voluntary, and triggered by the agreed sentence	Waiver enforceable; appeal dismissed
Whether prior conviction was an aggravated felony/crime of violence	Prior conviction was second-degree burglary, not robbery, so §1326(b)(2) and 16-level enhancement do not apply	Record and plea agreement consistently treated the conviction as robbery/aggravated robbery; defendant admitted the facts	Court found record supports robbery/aggravated robbery; no clear miscarriage of justice
Whether a miscarriage of justice exception to waiver applies	Error in characterization is clear and grave, warranting relief from waiver	No clear or grave error; defendant knowingly admitted bargain; government prejudiced by reopening plea	Exception not satisfied; applied sparingly and not met here
Whether sentence exceeded plea terms or triggered waiver improperly	Argues sentence rests on wrong predicate offense	Court sentenced to agreed Level 19; waiver condition satisfied	Sentence matched plea terms; waiver triggered and binding

United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (presumption of validity for knowing and voluntary appellate waivers; courts may relieve waiver only in narrow miscarriage-of-justice circumstances)
Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (requirement that district court inquire at plea colloquy about appellate waivers and their scope)
United States v. Gil-Quezada, 445 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2006) (miscarriage-of-justice exception to waiver applied sparingly; requires strong showing of innocence or unfairness)