United States v. Marschall, 3:20-cr-05270

Background

Defendant Richard Marschall was indicted for introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce after marketing and selling a product called the “Dynamic Duo” (Allimed garlic extract + IAG Arabinogalactans) as cures for serious diseases including MRSA and COVID-19.
It was undisputed Marschall advertised and sold the product; the parties disputed whether the product met the statutory definition of a “drug” and whether it was misbranded.
Marschall’s naturopathic license had previously been revoked following an earlier conviction for introducing misbranded drugs.
After a first trial ended in a mistrial, Marschall was convicted at a second trial and then moved for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial, arguing (1) the court refused requested jury instructions (full statutory definition of “drug” and definitions of “health claim” and “structure/function claim”), and (2) the prosecution was a speech-based case relying on uncorroborated confessions (corpus delicti issue).
The Government responded that the jury instructions given covered the relevant statutory definition, the excluded definitions were irrelevant and confusing, and the prosecution rested on Marschall’s conduct (marketing/shipping) corroborated by other evidence.
The court denied Marschall’s motion for acquittal or new trial and granted his motion for leave to file overlength briefs.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the jury should have been instructed with the full statutory definition of “drug” and with definitions of “health claim” and “structure/function claim”	The Government argued the statutory definition is disjunctive and the instruction given covered the relevant statutory prong the Government relied on	Marschall argued the court’s refusal deprived him of a fair trial and the jury needed the full definitions to evaluate the charge	Court held the full definition and additional definitions were irrelevant or confusing; the instruction covered the applicable prong and was sufficient
Whether the prosecution improperly relied solely on Marschall’s statements (corpus delicti / speech-based prosecution)	The Government argued the case was based on conduct (marketing and interstate shipment), not merely speech; Marschall’s statements were corroborative	Marschall argued the case was effectively a speech prosecution resting on uncorroborated confessions, implicating the corpus delicti doctrine	Court held corpus delicti inapplicable because independent evidence of conduct existed; conviction was not based solely on confession
Whether judgment of acquittal or a new trial was warranted under the Jackson/Rule 29/33 standards	Government argued evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict beyond a reasonable doubt	Marschall sought acquittal/new trial asserting instructional error and insufficiency	Court applied the Jackson standard and denied the motions, concluding the verdict was supported and a new trial was not required

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Ching Tang Lo, 447 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2006) (standard for judgment of acquittal review)
United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992) (evidentiary sufficiency standard)
United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (Jackson sufficiency principles explained)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (establishes standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (jury-instruction relevancy and confusion standard)
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (U.S. 1983) (statutory definition of “drug” is disjunctive)
United States v. Niebla-Torres, 847 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (corpus delicti doctrine prohibits convictions resting solely on uncorroborated confessions)